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resumo 
 
 
Nas redes móveis ad hoc (MANETs), onde o comportamento cooperativo é 
obrigatório, existe uma elevada probabilidade de alguns nós ficarem 
sobrecarregados nas operações de encaminhamento de pacotes no apoio à 
troca de dados com nós vizinhos. Este comportamento altruísta leva a uma 
sobrecarga desequilibrada em termos de tráfego e de consumo de energia. 
Nestes cenários, os nós móveis poderão beneficiar do uso da eficiência 
energética e de protocolo de encaminhamento de tráfego que melhor se 
adapte à sua capacidade limitada da bateria e velocidade de processamento. 
Este trabalho de doutoramento centra-se em propor um uso eficiente da 
energia e protocolos de encaminhamento para balanceamento de carga nas 
redes ad hoc. Actualmente a maioria dos protocolos de encaminhamento 
existentes considera simplesmente a métrica da extensão do caminho, ou seja 
o número de nós, para a escolha da melhor rota entre fonte (S) e um nó de 
destino (D); no mecanismo aqui proposto os nós são capazes de encontrar 
várias rotas por cada par de nós de origem e destino e seleccionar o melhor 
caminho segundo a energia e parâmetros de tráfego, aumentando o tempo de 
vida útil da rede. Os nossos resultados mostram que pela aplicação deste novo 
mecanismo, os protocolos de encaminhamento ad hoc actuais podem alcançar 
uma maior eficiência energética e balanceamento de carga. 
Para além disso, devido à natureza de difusão dos canais sem fio em redes 
ad-hoc, outras técnicas, tais como a Codificação de Rede (NC), parecem ser 
também promissoras para a eficiência energética. NC pode reduzir o número 
de transmissões, e número de retransmissões e aumentar a taxa de 
transferência de dados traduzindo-se directamente na melhoria da eficiência 
energética. No entanto, devido ao acesso dos nós intermediários aos pacotes  
em trânsito e sua codificação, NC necessita de uma técnica que limite as 
acessos não autorizados e a corrupção dos pacotes. Explorou-se o 
mecanismo de forma a oferecer um novo método de segurança que propõe um 
grau adicional de protecção contra ataques e invasões. Por conseguinte, os 
nós intermediários mal-intencionados irão encontrar pacotes em trânsito 
computacionalmente intratáveis em termos de descodificação. Adoptou-se 
também outro código que usa Luby Transform (LT) como um código de pré-
codificação no NC. Projectado inicialmente para aplicações de segurança, este 
código permite que os nós de destino recuperem pacotes corrompidos mesmo 
em presença de ataques bizantinos 
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abstract 
 
In Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs), where cooperative behaviour is 
mandatory, there is a high probability for some nodes to become overloaded 
with packet forwarding operations in order to support neighbor data exchange. 
This altruistic behaviour leads to an unbalanced load in the network in terms of 
traffic and energy consumption. In such scenarios, mobile nodes can benefit 
from the use of energy efficient and traffic fitting routing protocol that better 
suits the limited battery capacity and throughput limitation of the network. This 
PhD work focuses on proposing energy efficient and load balanced routing 
protocols for ad hoc networks. Where most of the existing routing protocols 
simply consider the path length metric when choosing the best route between a 
source and a destination node, in our proposed mechanism, nodes are able to 
find several routes for each pair of source and destination nodes and select the 
best route according to energy and traffic parameters, effectively extending the 
lifespan of the network.  Our results show that by applying this novel 
mechanism, current flat ad hoc routing protocols can achieve higher energy 
efficiency and load balancing. Also, due to the broadcast nature of the wireless 
channels in ad hoc networks, other technique such as Network Coding (NC) 
looks promising for energy efficiency. NC can reduce the number of 
transmissions, number of re-transmissions, and increase the data transfer rate 
that directly translates to energy efficiency. However, due to the need to access 
foreign nodes for coding and forwarding packets, NC needs a mitigation 
technique against unauthorized accesses and packet corruption. Therefore, we 
proposed different mechanisms for handling these security attacks by, in 
particular by serially concatenating codes to support reliability in ad hoc 
network. As a solution to this problem, we explored a new security framework 
that proposes an additional degree of protection against eavesdropping 
attackers based on using concatenated encoding. Therefore, malicious 
intermediate nodes will find it computationally intractable to decode the 
transitive packets. We also adopted another code that uses Luby Transform 
(LT) as a pre-coding code for NC. Primarily being designed for security 
applications, this code enables the sink nodes to recover corrupted packets 
even in the presence of byzantine attacks. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Ad hoc networking paradigm is a key enabling technology for Next-Generation Network 
(NGN), having significant application in connecting a multitude of wireless nodes or being 
able to operate in a more advanced mode by locally connecting different “things” of 
different capabilities, such as mobiles, Personal Device Assistance (PDAs), and laptops, 
among others. However, a pivotal design requirement for these scenarios is energy 
efficiency; many of these devices will be battery powered placing a fundamental limit on 
network, and specifically node lifetime. In the introduction, we outline the importance and 
application of ad hoc networks in society and for NGNs. In particular Section  1.1 describes 
ad hoc networks usages for future networks, and provides an overview of energy 
efficiency and the load balancing problem as a key driver for the work in this thesis. 
Section  1.2 outlines the objectives of this PhD work while the focus of each chapter is 
presented in Section  1.3. Finally, the novel contributions of this thesis are summarized in 
Section  1.4. 
1.1 Motivation 
1.1.1 “Ad Hoc” as Key Enabler for Future Networks 
Wireless networking technology has a profound effect on our everyday life due to its 
inherent features such as being mobile and ubiquitous in nature, and offering an 
inexpensive alternative to traditional wired networks. Wireless networking metaphorizes 
diverse networking topologies and capabilities: they may refer to a cordless alternative of 
the traditional fixed network, using a wireless infrastructure (e.g. a server, fixed routers, 
and access points) or may simply refer to an infrastructure-less solution that operates in “ad 
hoc” mode. In both cases, wireless networking technology can benefit from multi-hop 
communication in which a packet transverses multiple nodes to reach its destination. The 
CHAPTER  1 
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main difference between ad hoc networks and the traditional cellular networks is that no 
dedicated infrastructure exists for ad hoc networks. Therefore, in the latter, users have to 
collaborate in the routing process by storing and forwarding data packets on behalf of each 
other. Furthermore, the network should be designed for autonomous and distributed 
operation with capabilities for self-configuring, self-healing. These features of ad hoc 
networking technology make them attractive for NGNs. 
1.1.1.1 Ad hoc networks fundamentals 
An ad hoc network is a set of wireless mobile nodes forming a temporary network 
with a dynamic topology, without the aid of any established infrastructure or centralized 
administration. Each wireless mobile node operates not only as a host, but also as a router 
and forwards packets to other mobile nodes in the network that may not be within direct 
transmission range of each other. Therefore, by operating in “ad hoc” mode, a packet 
travelling from a source node toward a destination node may pass through multiple nodes 
to reach its destination. 
 
  Figure  1.1: A simple scenario of ad hoc network 
Figure 1.1 shows a simple ad hoc network where a source node (S) and a destination 
node (D) are not within direct transmission range of each other but still, via an intermediate 
node (I), can communicate with each other.  Based on this approach, several nodes such as 
laptop, smart phone, cell phone, tablet, and so on, may be connected to each other via an ad 
hoc network, and can reach the internet through an access router, as illustrated by figure 
1.2. 
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1.1.1.2 Characteristics 
Ad hoc networks have several key characteristics, included but not limited to: 
• Autonomous: Self-creation, self-organization, self-administration, self-healing, 
self-configuring, and distributed manner 
• Infrastructure-less 
• Multi-hop routing 
• Dynamic network topology 
• Device heterogeneity 
• Nodes with limited resources: energy, bandwidth, memory, and processing 
power. 
 
Figure  1.2: A simple scenario that shows ad hoc network nodes, via an access router, 
can reach to the internet 
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1.1.1.3 Applications 
There are several applications for ad hoc networks, including but not limited to: 
• Mobile communications: when there is little or no communication infrastructure or 
the existing infrastructure is expensive or inconvenient to use. By setting up an ad 
hoc network, wireless mobile users may still be able to communicate with each 
other. 
• Military: for autonomous communications and operations in battlefields 
• Emergency services: such as search and rescue operations, the recovery of 
networks after disasters, replacing current fixed infrastructure in case of 
earthquake, terrorist attack, and fire, ambulances communication, firefighting, and 
policing 
• Commercial and civilian applications: such as e-commerce, vehicular services like 
road or accident guidance, weather conditions, and so on. 
• Home and enterprise: such as wireless networking in house, conferences, and 
meeting rooms 
• Personal Area Networks (PANs), Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs), smart and 
wearable sensors in Body Area Networks (BANs) 
• Other applications: virtual classrooms, entertainment, robotic pets, touristic 
information,… 
1.1.1.4 Wide range of usage possibilities for future 
In this context, ad hoc networks is foreseen to create new paradigms where mobile 
nodes can connect to form Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET) [1], geared towards future 
emerging scenarios such as D2D communication, traffic loading, and energy saving among 
others. Mobile communications plays a pivotal role in our everyday life, with the number 
of mobile phone subscribers has already surpassing the 7 billion mark [2]. Ad hoc 
networking technology can connect a multitude of wireless tiny sensors or operate in a 
more advanced mode by locally connecting different “things” of different capabilities, such 
as Personal Device Assistance (PDAs), laptops, and so on, making then an ideal solution 
for the next-generation networks, envisaged for 2020. Apart from human communications, 
machines will also be connected and enabled to communicate either with humans or with 
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each other.  Hence, these wireless nodes will be very diverse in terms of resources, such as 
memory, battery power, bandwidth, and processing power. 
Also, one of the main benefits of ad hoc networks is related to extreme emergency 
cases like flood, earthquake, terrorist attacks, and disaster, among others. When the 
infrastructure goes down, ad hoc network can be a very efficient solution for setting up 
connectivity on demand. 
1.1.2 Reliable Ad hoc Routing Protocols and Energy Efficiency 
Pursuing high energy efficiency (EE) will be the trend for the design of future wireless 
networks. ICT sector including cellular networks, wired networks, and internet consumes 
more than 3% of the worldwide electric energy [1], which is expected to increase rapidly in 
the future. As an important part of ICT, wireless communications are also responsible for 
energy efficiency, considering exponential growth of mobile traffic in recent years. On the 
other hand, mobile terminals in wireless systems necessitate energy saving since the 
development of battery technology are much slower compared with the increase of energy 
consumption. Therefore, reducing energy consumption while meeting QoS requirements 
(such as data rate) in wireless networks and devices is an urgent task. Moreover, wireless 
networks and in particular ad hoc modes of operation have applications in extreme 
emergency scenarios, placing additional emphasis on EE design. 
EE operation in ad hoc networks, not only suggests that we ought to take into account 
the energy profile of the routing nodes, but also the way we manage the network traffic. In 
legacy routing approaches, some nodes may become overloaded by packet forwarding, 
especially the ones located at the edge of the network. Therefore, EE and load balancing 
are crucial for ad hoc routing protocols to not only prolong the network lifetime but also to 
ensure its robust and continuous operation.  
In legacy fixed networks, QoS has always been a predominant design. Metric, even 
though the internet could only deliver best effort. In wireless networks, QoS requirements 
are even more stringent, due to the variability of the channel and node mobility in 
MANETS. Therefore future ad hoc networks all need to be reliable, energy efficient whilst 
preserving QoS. 
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Traditionally, hard QoS routing guarantee in ad hoc networks is a Nondeterministic 
Polynomial time (NP)-Complete problem [3]. Therefore, the current works focus on 
providing a soft QoS routing guarantee for ad hoc networks as a more realistic solution. As 
a result, most of the existing routing protocols, proposed in MANET group of IETF [1], 
simply consider the path length metric when choosing the best route between a source (S) 
and a destination node (D). Although these approach can reduce the end-to-end delay in a 
communication session, they overlook the residual energy of the nodes as a decision 
criterion in the route selection process [4]. As such, they may not be efficient from energy 
perspective and lack a proper mechanism to handle and save critical nodes that are running 
out of power or being overloaded with traffic forwarding for other nodes. In this thesis, we 
consider energy efficiency and load balancing as the two main efficiency metrics. 
1.1.3 Reliable Network Coding and Ad hoc Networks 
In coding theory, there are three main coding families: source coding, channel coding 
and network coding (NC). The first, aims to compress information at the source, while the 
second introduces redundant bits at the link layer to guarantee reliable communications. 
On the other hand, the third consists in a coding process that takes place at the intermediate 
nodes in the network and at different layers of the network communication protocol stack.  
In fact network coding (NC), first proposed by Ahlswede et al. [5], allows 
intermediate nodes not only to store and forward data packets, but also combine digital 
messages. Intelligent mixing of packets is achieved by performing algebraic operations on 
such packets. Therefore, NC generalizes the store-and-forward approach of ad hoc 
networks into the store-code-forward paradigm to achieve a higher throughput. As 
illustrated by figure 1.3, the traditional store-and-forward approach needs four 
transmissions in a simple unicast communication between three mobile nodes, while the 
store-code-forward paradigm of NC using the dimple XOR operation for encoding, needs 
only three transmissions.  
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Figure  1.3: (a) the traditional store-and-forward versus (b) the store-code-forward 
paradigm of NC. 
1.1.3.1 NC meets ad hoc networks requirements 
Wireless multi-hop networks, e.g., ad hoc networks, have several certain features that 
provide a great opportunity for exploiting the benefits of NC in such networks. These 
features are : i) each transmission will be broadcasted in a certain zone via a shared 
wireless channel, ii) the transmission scheduling among nodes is conflict-free that means 
simultaneous single packet transmission or reception by any node of the network at any 
given time is not possible, and iii) instead of a continuous information flow for 
transmission, all communications are based on a multi-hop packet propagation in a store-
and-forward transmission [6].  
As an example to show the capability and the benefits of using NC in improving 
network throughput in a multicast communication, figure 1.4 shows a possible simple 
scenario for both the traditional store and forward mechanism and the elegant network 
coding store-code-forward paradigm.  Here the source node S wants to multicast some 
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packets toward two sink nodes D1 and D2. Each packet like   ! "#$% has a packet 
number and time stamp that shows the packet number which was assigned by the source 
node and the time that packet was forwarded. For simplicity each packet (or symbol) is 
considered as one bit. A traditional store and forward mechanism, would achieve 
maximum throughput of 1.5 bits/s, but NC allows both D1 and D2 to achieve a rate of 2 
bits/s at the same time which means more than 30% improvement in throughput for this 
scenario. 
NC benefits are not limited only to multicast communications, as shown by figure 1.4, 
they may also decrease the number of transmissions in a unicast communication, as 
illustrated in figure 1.3. 
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Figure  1.4: (a) Traditional store and forward mechanism in a multicast communication 
vs. (b) Network coding store-code-forward paradigm. 
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1.1.3.2 NC leads to energy efficiency in ad hoc networks 
Wireless multi-hop networks can benefit from NC paradigm to reach higher energy 
efficiency due to several reasons:  
i. Reduced transmissions: network coding in a multi-hop unicast and multicast 
transmission scenarios reduces the number of required transmissions, and the gain is 
reflected by the number of transmissions being proportional to energy efficiency [7]. 
Figure 1.3 (unicast transmission) and figure 1.4 (multicast transmission)  show two of 
those scenarios. 
 
ii. Reduced re-transmissions: network coding may decrease the number of re-
transmissions in a network with noisy and erroneous channels. Consider a wireless ad 
hoc network consisting of an imperfect channel in which a source node S wants to 
communicate a message, e.g., a file, to a set of sinks. The sink nodes may fail to 
receive the sent file from the source node S due to erroneous links and therefore the 
whole file should be re-transmitted again. However, in the network coding paradigm, 
the source node can divide the file into ℎ native packets and send out ℎ +  ( ≥ 0) 
linearly coded packets called codewords. All intermediate nodes send random linear 
combination of received codewords on the outgoing links. All sink nodes who receive 
any ℎ linear combination of sent codewords are able to decode them and extract the 
native packets (i.e., the original file). In a network consisting of erroneous links, sink 
nodes still have a chance to receive these independent codewords from several 
different paths and there is no need for re-transmission of the whole file. Decreasing 
number of re-transmissions leads to higher energy efficiency. 
 
iii. Higher unit of data per unit of energy (bits/joule): The main result of [5] was the 
enunciation of the max-flow min-cut theorem for information flow. In particular, the 
authors demonstrated that the multicast capacity is achieved by applying network 
coding. This achievement can bring a drastic change in improving the data throughput 
of networks. Achieving max-flow min-cut capacity means a higher data transfer rate 
and/or saving energy per each transferred bit of data (bits/ joule). 
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NC approach can be applied to several different layers of the network, protocol stack 
e.g., physical layer [8-12] and MAC layer [13-15]. As an example, NC is technology 
agnostic and can be applied to wireless multi-hop routing protocols. The coding operations 
of NC do not interfere with the routing protocols control packets and they effectively 
complement each other. NC applications are not limited to energy efficiency in wireless ad 
hoc networks [16-21] and include increasing network capacity, error detection and error 
correction in lossy networks, robustness, and security [5, 20, 22, 23].  
1.1.3.3 Need for a reliable NC mechanism in erroneous networks 
However, beside the aforementioned benefits of using NC for ad hoc networks 
especially in terms of energy efficiency, processing (recoding) the received data packets 
from the neighbors in the intermediate nodes and then forwarding them opens lots of 
challenging security issues in NC-based systems [24]. Codewords should pass through 
several relay terminals that give the opportunity to attackers and malicious nodes for 
unauthorized access, eavesdropping, and traffic analysis and monitoring. Consequently a 
security mechanism against eavesdropping attack is required for NC based networks. 
Also in an NC based system, the sink node may receive erroneous or corrupted 
codewords due to lossy links in the network or malicious intermediate nodes; 
consequently, sink node may fail to successfully decode packets. Therefore a mitigation 
technique against packet corruption is needed too. 
1.2 Objectives 
Considering these aforementioned issues, this thesis will tackle the following 
objectives in the scope of this PhD work: 
• Providing a concrete routing solution that is energy efficient: a key enabler of ad 
hoc networks is a routing approach that needs to be robust and lightweight (in terms of 
complexity) to support end-to-end connectivity in highly dynamic wireless 
environments. However, the effect of node/user mobility, dynamic topologies, 
frequent link breakages in the communication path, limitation on nodes resources such 
as battery energy, and lack of central point such as base stations or servers mean that 
routing in ad hoc networks can be a very challenging issue. In this context, 
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approaching a novel energy efficient routing protocol for ad hoc networks will be a 
key target. 
 
• Routing approach for load balancing: load dispersion leads to traffic concentration 
on some nodes in ad hoc networks and may increase delay, packet loss, and node 
failure. Proving a traffic balanced routing mechanism that also be able to deliver 
adequate QoS is challenging, especially in a highly mobile environment. In this thesis, 
we propose a load balanced routing mechanism that is technology agnostic and can be 
applied to flat ad hoc routing scenarios. 
 
• Proposing a mitigation technique against eavesdropping attacks in NC based 
systems: by using store-code-forward paradigm of NC, multi-hop networks can 
achieve a higher performance in terms of throughput and energy efficiency. However, 
wireless communications are susceptible to malicious relay nodes attempting to have 
unauthorized access to the transitive packets imposing several security threats and 
attacks such as eavesdropping, traffic analysis, and traffic monitoring. These issues 
serve as a springboard for providing reliable network codes that are robust against 
eavesdropping attacks. 
 
• Novel mitigation technique against packet corruption in NC based systems: Using 
NC in multi-hop networks such as ad hoc networks is prone to packet corruption. The 
transitive packets can be corrupted due to erroneous channels in the network (such as 
erasure or noisy wireless links), or they can be corrupted by malicious byzantine relay 
nodes. These corrupted packets have a severe effect on the decoding process at the 
destination node. Therefore, an objective of this PhD work will be to increase the 
reliability of NC towards erroneous wireless channels (e.g., noise, fading, or erasure) 
and byzantine attackers. 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
• In Chapter  1, we outline the main motivation for investigating the problem of energy 
efficiency for wireless ad hoc networking technology. We presented the principal 
concepts and applications of ad hoc networking technology that may have the 
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potential to shape Next-Generation Networks. However, we argued that the pivotal 
design requirements for future networks and ad hoc networking technology is energy 
efficiency, since many of these devices will be battery powered, placing a 
fundamental limit on network, and specifically node lifetime. We also argued that in 
wireless networks that take advantage of multi-hop communications, e.g., ad hoc 
networks, the store-code-forward approach of network coding can be an effective 
technique to improve the energy efficiency. However, network coding mechanism is 
vulnerable to security attacks due to the role of intermediate nodes in packet 
processing. Therefore, to benefit from a NC technique for energy efficiency in ad hoc 
networks, we need to ensure to mould our NC design to make it reliable and secure 
against unauthorized accesses and packet corruption due to erroneous wireless 
channels and byzantine attackers. 
 
• Chapter  2 provides the state of the art on wireless ad hoc networks. We categorized 
the current ad hoc routing protocols detailing their functionalities and applications. 
Also, the notion of providing an energy efficient and load balanced protocol for ad hoc 
networks was elaborated. We also compared several ad hoc routing protocols in terms 
of different QoS metrics. We discussed AODV, DSR, DSDV, and TORA routing 
protocols and compared them based on path optimality, delay, jitter, Normalize 
Routing Load, and Packet Delivery Ratio. We tested and analysed these protocols 
under several different situations categorized by changing the number of network’s 
node, the speed of nodes, and pause time. 
 
• In Chapter  3, we propose two new energy efficient and traffic balancing ad hoc routing 
protocols. The first routing protocol is based on the well-known Ad Hoc On-demand 
Distance Vector version 2 protocol (AODVv2). Our so called Energy Efficient 
AODVv2 (“E2AODVv2”) has been designed towards energy efficiency and load 
balancing; this can help in detecting the nodes that reach a critical battery level in the 
network and so it switches the route in order to avoid network fragmentation and to 
achieve a higher network lifetime. E2AODVv2 achieves a higher performance with 
respect to energy consumption balancing, scalability, network lifetime, and the 
percentage of failed nodes in comparison to well-known baseline protocols such 
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AODV, DSR, DYMO, DSDV, and TORA. Also, the E2AODVv2 routing protocol 
outperforms specifically in scenarios where the load of the network is not balanced. We 
also propose a new load balanced and energy efficient ad hoc routing protocol, called 
Load Balanced Dynamic Source Routing (LBDSR). We defined the control packets, 
routing tables, and the route selection method, resulting in enhanced LBDSR 
performance with respect to traffic load balancing, energy consumption balancing, and 
route’s reliability metrics.  
 
• Chapter  4 starts by introducing the fundamentals of NC and presents the key security 
assumptions of NC systems as well as a detailed analysis of the security goals and 
threats. Presenting taxonomy of the existing NC security mechanisms and schemes 
reported in the literature, we propose new reliability and security mechanisms for NC 
based systems. In particular, we propose security mechanisms for handling 
eavesdropping attack and packet corruption. 
 
• Chapter 5 includes the contributions of the thesis by presenting an overview of 
individual contributions per chapter and also our suggestions for future research. 
1.4 Novel Contributions 
The novel contributions of the thesis include the following: 
• New energy efficient and traffic balancing ad hoc routing protocol based on the well-
known IETF AODVv2 protocol. The new proposed routing protocol, E2AODVv2, 
achieves a higher performance with respect to energy consumption balancing, 
scalability, network lifetime, and the percentage of failed nodes in comparison to well-
known baseline protocols. 
 
• New energy efficient source routing protocol called Load Balanced Dynamic Source 
Routing (LBDSR). This version is more lightweight and can be customized to be more 
energy efficient or delay aware.  
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• Employing a serially concatenated NC based encoder in the source node, we propose a 
novel scheme, called Network Coding based Concatenated Code (NCCC), to make the 
underlying multi-hop path immune against any unauthorized accesses of an 
intermediate malicious node in NC based systems. 
 
• By concatenating the NC encoder with another error correcting code, namely the Luby 
Transform (LT) codes [25], we generate a unique instanc of Batched Sparse (BATS) 
code that achieves higher error correction gains for NC based communications. BATS 
can be effectively employed here to mitigate against malicious nodes or erroneous 
channels corrupting the transitive packets. 
 
The aforementioned contributions resulted in the following list of scientific 
publications:  
Journal papers 
1. V. Nazari Talooki, J. Rodriguez, and H. Marques, "Energy Efficient and 
Load Balanced Routing for Wireless Multihop Network Applications", 
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, vol. 2014, p. 13, 2014. 
2. T. A. Ramrekha, V. N. Talooki, J. Rodriguez, and C. Politis, "Energy 
Efficient and Scalable Routing Protocol for Extreme Emergency Ad Hoc 
Communications", Mob. Netw. Appl., vol. 17, pp. 312-324, 2012. 
Book chapters 
3. V. Nazari Talooki, H. Marques, J. Rodriguez, H. Água, N. Blanco, and L. 
Campos, "E2DSR: Preliminary Implementation Results and Performance 
Evaluation of an Energy Efficient Routing Protocol for Wireless Ad Hoc 
networks", in Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social 
Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering series. vol. 0077, ed, 2012. 
4. T. A. Ramrekha, V. N. Talooki, J. Rodriguez, and C. Politis, "Energy efficient 
and Scalable Routing Protocol for Extreme Emergency Ad Hoc 
Communications", in Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, 
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Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering series. vol.  0077, ed, 
2012. 
Conference papers 
5. Vahid N. Talooki, Riccardo Bassoli, Jonathan Rodriguez, Hugo Marques, 
Rahim Tafazolli ,“Network Coding Based Surveillance Applications in 
Presence of Erroneous Channels”, Workshop co-located with the IEEE 
Symposium on Computers and Communications - ISCC 2014, 23-26 June 
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6. Riccardo Bassoli, Vahid N. Talooki, Hugo Marques, Jonathan Rodriguez, 
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7. R. Bassoli, V. Talooki, H. Marques, J. Rodriguez, and R. Tafazolli, "Energy 
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coding", in IEEE 18th International Workshop on Computer Aided Modeling 
Analysis and Design of Communication Links and Networks (CAMAD), 2013, 
pp. 1-6. 
8. V. Talooki, H. Marques, and J. Rodriguez, "Energy Efficient Dynamic 
MANET On-demand (E2DYMO) Routing Protocol", in IEEE World of 
Wireless-Mobile and Multimedia Networks - CONWIRE workshop, 2013, pp. 
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9. V. Talooki, D. E. Lucani, H. Marques, and J. Rodriguez, "Foreseen Risks for 
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10. D. Yang, J. Bachmatiuk, V. Talooki, and J. Rodriguez, "Improved CodeCast 
For SVC Video Multicast", in IEEE 18th International Workshop on 
Computer Aided Modeling Analysis and Design of Communication Links and 
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2 FUNDAMENTALS ON AD HOC ROUTING 
PROTOCOLS 
This chapter introduces the fundamental literature concepts of ad hoc networks that will 
act as a lunch pad for the proposed work in this PhD study. The chapter reviews the 
routing protocol concept for ad hoc networks and the motivation for energy efficient and 
load balanced protocol in ad hoc networks.  In this chapter, we will also compare several 
ad hoc routing protocols in terms of different QoS metrics. 
2.1 Ad hoc Routing Protocols 
Ad hoc networks can appear in more complex scenarios which have a complicated and 
dynamic topology. In this case, any two nodes who want to start a communication may 
have several possible paths between each other via multi-hops routes, as illustrated by 
figure 2.1. Therefore, we need an ad hoc routing protocol for finding and maintaining a 
route between any desired source and destination nodes in the network. 
Routing in ad hoc networks is a very challenging issue due to nodes mobility, dynamic 
topology, frequent link breakage, limitations of nodes (memory, battery, bandwidth, and 
processing power), and lack of central point like base stations or servers. On the other 
hand, there are several performance metrics and that should be satisfied in an ad hoc 
network such as end-to-end data delivery throughput, average end-to-end delay, and path 
optimality. Each protocol can satisfy some of these metrics, but with drawbacks towards 
others. Therefore, by comparing different ad hoc routing protocols we can extract 
important information surrounding the performance of these protocols in different 
scenarios. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
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Figure  2.1: There are several possible multi-hop routes between S and D 
Many routing algorithms have been proposed for ad hoc networks in the literature [26-
33]. Survey paper [34] categorized and reviewed several of them. These routing protocols 
can be divided into several categories based on various criteria. Also, there is an active 
group, called Mobile Ad-hoc NETwork (MANET), in Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF) [1] regarding ad hoc networks. In this chapter, we briefly review the categories of 
ad hoc routing protocols. 
2.1.1 Flat Routing Protocols 
Flat routing protocols in ad hoc networks adopt a flat addressing scheme which means 
all nodes participating in the routing process play an equal role. Flat routing protocols may 
generally be classified into two main categories: i) proactive routing protocols and ii) 
reactive routing protocols. 
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2.1.1.1 Proactive protocols 
This type of ad hoc routing protocols attempt to find and maintain consistent, up-to-
date routes between all source-destination pairs regardless of the use or need of such 
routes. Therefore, each node maintains one or more tables to store routing information 
(table driven protocols). The proactive protocols require periodic control messages to 
maintain routes up to date for each node. Routing techniques for the proactive protocols 
are either i) Distance Vector (DV), ii) Link State(LS), or iii) a mixture of DV and LS [35, 
36]. 
Destination Sequenced Distance Vector 
DSDV was introduced in [26]; it is a proactive table-driven protocol based on the 
classical Bellman-Ford algorithm. In the DSDV, every node in the network maintains a 
routing table. A routing table has all of the possible destinations nodes and the number of 
hops to each destination. Each entry in the routing table has a sequence number assigned 
by the destination node that implies the freshness of that route; thereby, avoiding the 
formation of routing loops. By periodically update messages, routing tables maintain 
consistence. In order to avoid a growing network traffic, that can be caused by these update 
messages, route updates can employ two possible types of packets. The first is known as 
full dump. This type of update packet includes all available routing information. Smaller 
incremental packets include only that information which has changed since the last full 
dump [37]. New route broadcasts contain the address of destination, the number of hops to 
reach the destination, the sequence number of the information receipt regarding the 
destination, as well as a new unique sequence number for the new route broadcast. The 
route which is labelled with the most recent sequence number is always used [38, 39]. 
Optimized Link State Routing Protocol  
OLSR [28] uses link state mechanism. It is an optimization of the classical link state 
algorithm that uses multipoint relays (called MPRs) for routing operations. The MPRs are 
selected nodes which forward broadcast messages during the flooding process. In OLSR, 
link state information is generated only by nodes selected as the MPRs. An MPR node 
reports only links between itself and its MPR selector; therefore, partial link state 
information is distributed in the network. This information is then used for route 
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calculation. The OLSR provides optimal routes in terms of number of hops and it uses two 
messages [40]: i) Hello Messages: are used by each node to find its one hop neighbours 
and its two hop neighbours through their responses. The sender can then select its MPRs 
based on the one hop node such that there exists a path to each of its two hop neighbours 
via its MPRs. ii) TC (Topology Control) Messages: are emitted by the MPR nodes for all 
other nodes and contain the MPR selectors (nodes have selected it as an MPR node). 
Wireless Routing Protocol  
WRP that applies to both distance vector and link state techniques was introduced in 
[33] for the first time. The WRP is a subset of a general class of Path-Finding Algorithms 
(PFA). The PFA defined as the set of distributed shortest-path algorithms that compute the 
paths using information concerning the length and second-to-last hop (predecessor) of the 
shortest path to each destination. The WRP also addresses the problem of avoiding short-
term loops that can still be present in such algorithms for the paths specified by the 
predecessor node. The protocol uses the following four data structures: i) Distance table, ii) 
Routing table, iii) Link-cost table, and iv) Message Retransmission List (MRL) [36, 40]. 
2.1.1.2 Reactive protocols 
In reactive approach, routes are created only when a source node requests them (also 
called on-demand approach). Forwarding process is accomplished according to two main 
techniques i) Source routing protocols and ii) Hop-by-hop routing. 
Dynamic Source Routing 
DSR [27] is a source routing protocol and requires the sender to know the complete 
route to the destination. It is based on two main processes: i) the route discovery process 
which is based on flooding and is used to dynamically discover new routes and maintain 
them in the nodes cache and; ii) the route maintenance process which periodically detects 
and notifies networks topology changes. The discovered routes will be cached in the 
relative nodes.  
If the route to destination is not known, a route discovery process is initiated in order 
to find a valid route. The route discovery is based on flooding the network with route 
request (RREQ) packets. Every mobile host, that receives a RREQ packet, checks the 
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contents of its routing cache, and if it is the destination, it replies to the RREQ with a route 
reply (RREP) packet that is routed back to the original source. In case none of the above 
holds, the host that receives the RREQ re-broadcasts it to the neighborhood. In this way the 
RREQ is propagated till the destination. Note that both the RREQ and RREP packets are 
also source routed. The RREQ maintains the path navigated across the network; thus, the 
RREP can route itself back to the source by traversing the recorded path backwards. The 
route carried by the RREP packet is cached at the source for future use. If any link on a 
source route path is broken, the source host is notified with a special route error (RERR) 
packet from the immediate nodes. After receiving a RERR message, the node removes all 
the routes in its routing cache that use the ‘broken’ link [41]. 
Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector  
AODV was introduced in [42] and it is a combination of the DSR and the DSDV 
protocols. It uses the on-demand mechanism of route discovery and route maintenance 
from DSR and the hop-by-hop routing and sequence number from DSDV. Per each 
destination, AODV creates a routing table like DSDV, while DSR uses node cache to 
maintain routing information [43]. 
In AODV, when a node needs a route to a destination node, it broadcasts a RREQ 
message to its neighbours. This message includes the last known sequence number for that 
destination. The RREQ is flooded in the network until it reaches a node that has a route to 
the destination. During this controlled flooding of the RREQ, each node, that forwards the 
RREQ, creates a reverse route for itself to source node and records it. If additional copies 
of the same RREQ are later received, they will be dropped. When the destination node 
receives the RREQ, it replies, with a RREP packet, back to the neighbour from which it 
first has received the RREQ. Intermediate nodes that forward this ROUTE REPLY back to 
the source, creates a forward route to the destination and updates their route tables. Each 
node periodically creates and transmits a HELLO message to maintain its route table up- 
to- date [44]. 
2.1.2 Hierarchical Routing Protocols  
In Hierarchical routing protocols, the network’s nodes are divided into clusters. Each 
cluster has an admin entity (head cluster) which is responsible for routing inside that 
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cluster; therefore, in this context nodes have different responsibilities and importance in 
routing algorithm. Also, the cluster head election can be a dynamical and distributed 
operation. Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) [45] is a hybrid/hierarchical routing protocol that 
takes  advantage of both proactive and reactive schemes by creating overlapped zones 
based on the separation distances between wireless nodes. The ZRP tries to limit the 
flooding area per each node by assigning a routing zone to that node [34].  
2.1.3 Geographical Position Based 
These types of protocols assume that each node in the network is aware of its own 
location and the status of its one-hop neighbors, e.g., via a Global Positioning System 
(GPS). In the  Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) [46] protocol, in any 
communication between a source-destination pair of nodes, the source node is aware of the 
destination node´s location. All one-hop neighbors exchange beacon control messages 
between each other to simultaneously update their routing tables and limit control message 
overhead [34]. 
2.1.4 Hybrid Protocols 
Hybrid protocols, by mixing different routing algorithms, try to take advantage of the 
previously mentioned protocols to reach to the highest efficiency. Temporally-Ordered 
Routing Algorithm (TORA) was introduced in [31] and it is a highly adaptive loop-free 
distributed routing algorithm based on the concept of link reversal. TORA is proposed to 
operate in a highly dynamic mobile networking environment. It is source initiated and 
provides multiple routes for any desired source/destination pair. Nodes in TORA need to 
maintain routing information about their adjacents, i.e., one-hop neighbors. The protocol 
performs three basic functions: i) route creation, ii) route maintenance, and iii) route 
deletion. In TORA, the intermediate nodes maintain a height that is the number of hops 
between the intermediate and the destination node. To assign the height to each node, A 
Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that is rooted at the destination node is used. Due to 
dynamic topology of ad hoc networks, the DAG route may be disconnected when a node 
moves. Therefore route maintenance is necessary to re-establish a DAG rooted at the same 
destination. Also, the height parameter is determined based on a logical time of a link 
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failure. In the deletion phase, when a link breakage is detected by a node, it generates a 
CLEAR packet that deletes the invalid routes from the route cache of the node[47]. 
A category of current ad hoc routing protocols is illustrated by figure 2.2. 
 
Figure  2.2: A structure of ad hoc routing protocols categories 
2.2 Baseline for Legacy Ad hoc Routing Protocols 
Routing, in ad hoc networks, is a very challenging issue due to nodes mobility, 
dynamic topology, frequent link breakage, limitation of nodes (memory, battery, 
bandwidth, and processing power), and lack of central point, such as base stations or 
servers. On the other hand, there are lots of performance metrics and quality services 
which should be satisfied in an ad hoc network, like end-to-end data throughput, average 
end-to-end delay, jitter, packet loss ratio, and so on. Each protocol can satisfy some of 
these metrics but with some drawbacks in terms of other metrics. Furthermore, due to the 
nature of ad hoc networks (distributed and cooperated routing), even for a fixed metric, 
each protocol can show a different performance for different networks features such as 
number of mobile nodes, mobility of nodes, and pause time. By comparing different ad hoc 
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routing protocols, we can extract very important information about the performance of 
these protocols in different situations. 
In related works, the performance of some protocols like DSDV [37] and AODV [48] 
are analysed individually and some other multi hop protocols are compared [35, 49], but 
this chapter presents an extensive performance comparison between source routing 
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), hob-by-hop routing Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector 
(AODV), distance vector based routing Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV), 
and a link state source routing Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA). 
Furthermore, where most of the previous works focused on some well-known metrics (e.g.,  
delay and throughput), the present study  not only considers the average end to end delay, 
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), and Normalize Routing Load (NRL) but also introduces new 
weighted path optimality metric. Also, we present the performance comparisons of these 
protocols in terms of jitter metric that is an important QoS metric for the video and voice 
transmission networks. Additionally, most of the related works on performance 
comparisons of ad hoc routing protocols are limited to only number of the nodes in the 
network [50], pause time [51], or nodes´ speed; but, this study considers different 
movement and communication models.  
In this section, we shortly review four well-known ad hoc routing protocols: i) DSDV, 
ii) DSR, iii) AODV, and iv) TORA and carry out a comparison study for different 
communication and movement models within a simulation environment.  
i. Destination Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) 
DSDV uses distance vector mechanism and it is a proactive table-driven protocol 
based on the classical Bellman-Ford algorithm. All nodes try to find all paths to the 
possible destination nodes in a network and to save them in their routing tables. 
ii. Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
DSR [27] is a reactive (On demand) source routing protocol. Route Discovery process 
is based on flooding the network with route request (RREQ) packets. Every mobile host 
that receives a RREQ packet checks the contents of its route cache, and if it is the 
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destination it replies to the RREQ with a route reply (RREP) packet that is routed back to 
the original source and the RREQ is propagated till the destination [27, 39]. 
iii. Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
AODV [42] uses the on-demand mechanism of route discovery and route maintenance 
from the DSR and also a mechanism for the hop-by-hop routing and sequence number. Per 
each destination, AODV creates a routing table, while DSR uses node cache to maintain 
routing information. 
iv. Temporary Ordered Routing Protocols (TORA) 
Temporally-Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) [31] is a highly adaptive loop-free 
distributed routing algorithm based on the concept of link reversal and it applies a reactive 
(on demand) source routing scheme. The key design concept of TORA is the reduction of 
control messages to a very small set of topological changes by performing three basic 
functions: Route creation, Route maintenance, and Route deletion. All nodes in TORA use 
a “height” metric to establish a direct acyclic graph (DAG) rooted at the destination [52]. 
2.3 Simulation Environment 
We use Two-Ray Ground Reflection Model which considers both the direct path and a 
ground reflection path between two mobile nodes. Also, all nodes in the network move 
based on the Random Way Point Mobility Model. In this movement model, a mobile node 
starts its travel from a random location inside the topology area after pausing for a certain 
period of time (called “pause time”). After the initial pause time, the mobile node chooses 
another random location inside the topology area and moves toward this new location by a 
speed that is uniformly distributed between a predefined minimum and maximum speed. 
Upon arrival, the mobile node pauses again for the pause time and repeats the previous 
process again till the simulation time is expired [35, 53]. 
The simulation results presented in this chapter were obtained using the ns-2 simulator 
[54]. This is a discrete event, object oriented, simulator from Lawrence Berkeley National 
laboratory (LBNL) with extensions from the MONARCH Project at Carnegie Mellon 
University [55]. The Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) of IEEE 802.11 for wireless 
LANs is used as the MAC layer. The RTS/CTS exchange precedes the data packet 
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transmission and implements a form of virtual carrier sensing and channel reservation to 
reduce the impact of the well-known hidden terminal problem. 
Movement model I, characterized by pause time 
Topology area 800m x 800m 
Maximum mobility of nodes 15 m/s 
Pause time 0..100 s 
Number of nodes 35 
Simulation time 100s 
Movement model II, characterized by number of mobile nodes 
Topology area 800m x 800m 
Maximum mobility of nodes 20 m/s 
Pause time 30s 
Number of nodes 10…60 
Simulation time 100s 
Movement model III, characterized by node mobility 
Topology area 800m x 800m 
Maximum mobility of nodes 0m/s…40m/s 
Pause time 25s 
Number of nodes 40 
Simulation time 100s 
Parameters of communication model 
Traffic sources CBR 
Data packets size 1024 bytes 
Sending rate 8 packets/second 
Maximum connection 4 
Table  2.1: Simulation Parameters for Comparing the Protocols  
Broadcasting data packets and the RTS control are sent using physical carrier sensing. 
An unslotted CSMA technique with collision avoidance is used to transmit these packets 
[35]. The radio model uses characteristics similar to commercial radio interface. 
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The movement scenario files we used for each simulation are categorized into three 
different groups based on the pause time, number of mobile nodes, and maximum node 
mobility.   
Table  2.1 lists the parameters of the three movement models and the communication 
model. Each of the movement files, together with a communication scenario file, create the 
input to the simulation. In each of the two groups, each run is executed for 100 seconds of 
simulation time and models a network of ad hoc nodes in an 800m x 800m topology area. 
2.4 Evaluation Metrics 
There are several QoS metrics for comparing ad hoc (e.g., MANETs) routing 
protocols. In this section, we introduce some of these metrics that we used in this chapter 
for comparing different routing protocols. 
i. Weighted path optimality 
The difference between the number of hops a packet took to reach its destination, and 
the length of the shortest path that physically existed through the network when the packet 
was originated, is a metric that shows the optimality of paths selected by an ad hoc routing 
protocol [35]. Path optimality metric is as follows:  
67 = ∑ 9:;()<;()=>?@A "      ( 2.1) 
However, in this definition the importance or usage rate of paths selected by the 
protocols is not taken into account. Consequently, to reach to a more precise metric, we 
modify the traditional path optimality metric by considering the percentage of network 
traffic that is transferred through each path. Weighted Path Optimality (WPO) is as 
follows:  
67 = ∑ (9:;()<;()=×())>?@A "×∑ ()>?@A      ( 2.2) 
Where WPO stands for weighted path optimality, AL(i) is the length of the path  that 
actually is taken by the protocol, F() is the length of the shortest path that existed 
physically when path  was selected by the protocol, FF() is the size of total packets that 
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had been transferred through path , and N is the number of paths in the network (from the 
beginning of simulation to the end). 
ii. Average end-to-end delay 
End-to-end delay includes all possible delays caused by the buffering during route 
discovery latency, transmission delays at MAC layer, queuing at interface queue, and 
propagation and transfer time. During the entire simulation time, there are M data packets 
transmitted between the source and the sink nodes. Let us assume that at time Si a source 
node sends a packet () and a sink node receives it successfully at time Ri, i=[56]. The 
end-to-end delay of packet  is calculated as follows:  
G() = H . F      ( 2.3) 
And the average end-to-end delay of successfully transmitted data packets in the 
network is calculated as follows: 
G = ∑ I(?)J?@AK        ( 2.4) 
iii. Jitter 
In a data transmission between a pair of source and sink nodes, jitter is the variation in 
the time between packets arriving at the source node. Let us assume that at time Si the 
source node sends packet   and the sink node receives it at time Ri. The jitter of packet  
is calculated as follows:  
L  = |(HNO . H) . (FNO . F)| = |(HNO . FNO) . (H . F)|  ( 2.5) 
During the entire simulation time, in a communication between a pair of source and 
sink nodes, there are M streams of packets, each stream consisting of P packets. We 
studied the average jitter of all streams of data in the network. 
iv. Normalized routing load (NRL) 
NRL is the number of routing packets transmitted per CBR data packet delivered 
successfully at the destination. That is: 
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H = ∑ %P#QR_ !TU?@A∑ VWX_% YIJ?@A      ( 2.6) 
Where Z is the number of total routing packets generated by the routing protocol 
during the simulation time and M is the number of data packets delivered successfully to 
the destinations. 
v. Packet delivery ratio (PDR) 
PDR shows the ability of a routing protocol to successfully deliver the data packets 
from the source to the destination nodes. That is: 
[H = ∑ VWX_TQ\?@A ∑ VWX_% YIJ?@A       ( 2.7) 
Where ] is the number of total CBR data packets sent by the source nodes during the 
simulation time and M is the number of data packets delivered successfully to the 
destinations.  
2.5 Simulation Results 
In this section, simulation results comparing DSDV, AODV, DSR, and TORA, in 
terms of weighted path optimality, average end-to-end delay, average jitter, NRL, and PDR 
are presented by changing the pause time, number of nodes, and nodes mobility. All times 
are in second. 
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Figure  2.3: Weighted path optimality 
vs. number of nodes 
 
Figure  2.4: Weighted path optimality 
vs. pause time 
Figure  2.5: Weighted path optimality 
vs. mobility 
 
Figure  2.6: Average delay vs. number 
of nodes 
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i. Weighted path optimality 
Figure 2.3-5 highlight the performance of four protocols with respect to weighted path 
optimality metric versus number of nodes in the network (i.e., network size), pause time, 
and the maximum speed of the nodes in the network (also called velocity or mobility of 
nodes). The closer the value is to zero, the better the weighted path optimality will be 
achieved. As mentioned before, DSDV employs Bellman-Ford algorithm to find the 
shortest path between a source node and a destination node. Hence, DSDV performs 
particularly well, regardless of changing in number of nodes, pause time, and mobility. 
DSR, AODV, and TORA are the next protocols in terms of performance, respectively.  
ii. Average end-to-end delay 
Figure 2.6-8 show the performance of DSR, AODV, DSR, and TORA in terms of 
average end-to-end delay versus number of nodes, pause time, and mobility, respectively. 
As mentioned before, end-to-end delay of data packets includes all possible delay caused 
by buffering during route discovery latency, transmission delays at the MAC, queuing at 
interface queue, and propagation and transfer time.  Among the four protocols, DSDV has 
the shortest average end-to-end delay. DSDV is a proactive protocol and the advantage of 
these protocols is that a path to a destination is immediately available; therefore, no delay 
for route discovery is experienced when an application needs to send a packet. In addition, 
in reactive protocols, AODV is hop by hop initiated while the DSR is a source routing 
protocol.  
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Figure  2.7: Average delay vs.  pause 
time 
 
 Figure  2.8: Average delay vs. mobility  
The source routing protocols have longer delay because their route discovery takes 
more time as every intermediate node tries to extract information before forwarding the 
reply. And the same issue happens when a data packet is forwarded hop by hop through the 
path by the source routing method. Hence, while source routing makes route discovery 
more profitable, it slows down the transmission of packets. This is the reason why AODV 
performs better than the two other reactive protocols, in general.  Simulation results 
demonstrate a good performance of DSDV and AODV, but a poor performance of DSR. 
TORA has the worst performance among the protocols. On the other hand, increasing the 
node number of networks does not greatly affect TORA with respect to average end-to-end 
delay.  
iii. Jitter 
Figure 2.9-11 show the performance of DSR, AODV, DSDV, and TORA, in terms of 
average jitter versus number of nodes, pause time, and mobility respectively. Here each 
protocol’s curves fluctuate around some similar values, regardless of change in the number 
of nodes (figure 2.9), pause time (figure 2.10), and mobility (figure 2.11). All curves have 
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an ascending shape, but in a slight manner. The average jitter of DSDV is relatively low 
and within the expected range. DSR has the worst average jitter among all these routing 
protocols. 
iv. Normalized routing load 
Figure 2.12-14 show the performance of DSR, AODV, DSDV, and TORA, in terms of 
normalized routing load versus number of nodes, pause time, and mobility, respectively. A 
low pause time or a high mobility leads to a higher link breakage, less reliable routes, and 
very dynamic topology. Routing protocols may adapt themselves to a dynamic topology by 
maintaining the freshest routing information. DSR generates less control packets than the 
other protocols which make it a lightweight routing protocol that can be very suitable for 
limited devices, in terms of battery, memory, and processing power.  
v. Packet delivery Ratio 
On-demand routing protocols, such as AODV and DSR, have a high throughput in terms of 
successfully delivering the data packets to their destinations which lead to a high PDR, 
regardless of number of nodes, pause time, and mobility of nodes, as figure 2.15-17 show, 
respectively. On the other hand, DSDV is a reactive table driven protocol and is not very 
adaptive to route changes and link breakages due to node mobility, and low pause time 
leads to a lower PDR.  
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Figure  2.9: Average jitter vs. number of 
nodes 
Figure  2.10: Average jitter vs. pause 
time 
Figure  2.11: Average jitter vs. mobility Figure  2.12: NRL vs. number of nodes 
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Figure  2.13: NRL vs. pause time 
 Figure  2.14: NRL vs. mobility 
Figure  2.15: PDR vs. number of nodes 
 
Figure  2.16: PDR vs. pause time 
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 Figure  2.17: PDR vs. mobility 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we described the basic principles of ad hoc networks. We presented a 
categorization of the current routing protocols for ad hoc networks, presented the 
performance study of several ad hoc routing protocols. We have compared four protocols, 
DSDV, AODV, DSR, and TORA, with respect to several metrics, such as path optimality, 
average end-to-end delay, jitter, Normalized Routing Load (NRL), and Packet Delivery 
Ratio (PDR). In comparison to the related previous works on this subject, here we used a 
wide range of different movement and communication scenarios which are characterized 
by the pause time, mobility, and the number of nodes to find the benefits and drawback of 
these protocols for different scenarios. Most of the studied protocols perform well in some 
cases, yet with some certain drawbacks in the others. DSDV performs very well in 
weighted path optimality while TORA has the worst performance. We observed that 
DSDV and AODV have the best performance in terms of average end to end delay. DSDV 
has the best average jitter and then AODV, TORA, and DSR in respective orders. Also, 
proactive on-demand routing protocols such as AODV and DSR show higher performance 
in terms of PDR and NRL. 
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3 Energy Efficient Ad hoc Routing 
In this chapter, we propose two new ad hoc routing protocols: Energy Efficient Ad hoc On-
demand Distance Vector version 2 (E2AODVv2) and Load balanced Dynamic Source 
Routing (LBDSR) for achieving higher energy efficiency and load balancing capability. The 
new proposed routing protocols aim to achieve higher energy efficiency, enabling 
mechanisms to handle and save critical nodes, and to handle traffic balancing in the 
network by considering the energy, traffic, and length of the routes. 
3.1 Energy Efficient Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector version 2 
(E2AODVv2) 
As the first contribution of this thesis, we propose a novel energy efficient and load 
balanced ad hoc routing protocol, employing appropriate mechanisms to detect the critical 
nodes and adjust their load to avoid early node failure. 
3.1.1 Introduction  
In a dynamic topology, such as MANETs, nodes can freely move; this often leads to 
link breakage and effect the interlaying of the previously founded routes. It is a complex 
problem that any dynamic wireless routing protocol has to solve.  
The dynamic topology in ad hoc networks implies that some nodes may relay more 
traffic than others, mainly because of their location in the network; these hot spots will 
consume their battery energy faster than the others. Unbalanced battery consumption in the 
network nodes can lead to several problems such as early node failure, network 
partitioning, and reduced route reliability. Traffic concentration on these nodes may 
increase delay and packet loss. Also, since the majority of the network traffic may 
potentially pass through these nodes, they can become an important target for attackers. 
CHAPTER 3 
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Power-aware routing algorithms aim to deliver new routing paths that take into 
account energy as a metric. For example, Gomez et al. [57] propose adding new 
intermediate nodes to a route from a source to a destination to reduce the overall required 
transmission power of the intermediate nodes. Lindgren and Schelen [58] improve the 
AODV routing protocol in terms of energy efficiency, by selecting paths through Power 
Base Stations (PBSs) instead of through normal nodes. Edwards et al. [59, 60] and 
Djenouri and Badache [59, 60] address two power-aware extensions of the original DSR ad 
hoc routing protocol that use energy aware metrics, such as the remaining battery power to 
decide which nodes should participate more often in packet forwarding. Load balancing 
and homogeneous distribution of battery energy consumptions among the nodes is another 
solution to achieve a power-aware ad hoc routing algorithm that is addressed in [61]. 
However, most of the existing power-aware approaches lead to some common 
drawbacks, such as requiring global topology information, increased delay, and increase in 
the number of required control messages that should be created by the routing protocol to 
deliver the user´s data packets (metric called Normalized Routing Load), and limited 
scalability [57-64].  
Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector version 2 (AODVv2) protocol [65] is a well-
known routing protocol presented by Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET) group of 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [1]; it applies a uniformed message format and has 
inherent features to support many required QoS metrics; but it is limited in terms of energy 
and traffic management.  
We exploit AODVv2 as a fundamental building block and go beyond this by 
designing and implementing energy and traffic aware capability by proposing an Energy 
Efficient Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector version 2 (E2AODVv2) that can provide a 
weighted and flexible trade-off between energy consumption and load dispersion for 
reactive flat routing protocols.  
We implemented several simulation scenarios to test the capability of E2AODVv2, 
where simulation results show that the proposed protocol achieves high energy efficiency, 
decreases the percentage of failed nodes due to lack of battery power, and extends the 
lifespan of the network. The proposed approach can be applied to any flat ad hoc routing 
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protocols. The position of the new proposed routing protocol, E2AODVv2 is shown in 
figure 3.1. 
 
Figure  3.1: The position of E2AODVv2 and LBDSR in ad hoc routing protocols 
categories 
3.1.2 Revised Ad Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODVv2) 
AODVv2 is a successor to the AODV that is being developing by IETF MANET; 
prior to the 26th revision ([65]), AODVv2 was called DYnamic MANET On-demand 
(DYMO).  
3.1.2.1 Protocol description of AODVv2 
AODVv2 tries to simplify the current reactive protocols, such as DSR and AODV, and 
simultaneously conserves their two main well known routing operations: route discovery 
and route maintenance  [66]. It has multipath capability (optional) and is also a hop-by-hop 
routing protocol. Therefore, intermediate nodes, located in a route between a source and a 
destination node, are able to extract additional information from the control packets. 
AODVv2 applies a standard generalized MANET Packet/Message format  [67] for control 
packets: A uniformed message format, called Routing Message (RM), is used for all 
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control messages and routing packets. Another interesting feature of AODVv2 is the 
capability to support Internet Protocol (IP)  [68] version 4 and 6 (IPv4 and IPv6 
respectively) which can be considered an essential feature for next-generation networks. 
Several works analysed the performance and benefits of AODVv2 [66, 69, 70]. [71] 
focused on reducing the delay and on increasing the packet delivery ratio, by finding routes 
with high probability to be used in future. Also, there are few works such as [69], that try 
to extend a multipath version of  AODVv2 to switch between different paths from source 
to destination in order to balance the battery power consumption and the traffic of the 
nodes on the different routes. However, these works do not provide a mechanism for 
handling both load balancing and energy efficiency in highly dynamic topologies.  
3.1.2.2 Routing operations of AODVv2 
All routing operation in AODVv2 can be categorized into three phases: 
i. Route Request Phase 
In a communication between a source node (S) and a destination node (D), S 
originates a Route Message (RM), called ROUTE REQUEST (RREQ) message, and 
broadcasts this to all of its neighbours. These RREQs are then flooded in the network until 
they reach D. An intermediate node which does not know the route to D should forward 
the RREQ to its neighbours. The intermediate node will also drop the repeated request for 
the same destination and will not forward them anymore, as shown by figure 3.2. Routing 
Messages (RM), i.e., RREQ, RREP, or RERR, has several fields such as current node 
address, next node address, HopLimit (the default value is 10 based on [65]), Target 
(destination node address if it is an RREQ message), and the Origin (source node address if 
it is an RREQ message) [65]. By tracing the RREQ traversed path (called accumulated 
path), each node, such as the intermediate or destination node who receives an RREQ 
message, can extract routing information.  Figure 3.2 shows the RREQ phase in AODVv2 
routing protocol for a sample network. 
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Figure  3.2:  A sample of RREQ phase in AODVv2 
 
Figure  3.3:  A sample of RREP phase in AODVv2 
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ii. Route Reply Phase 
As shown by figure 3.3, when RREQs finally reach the destination node, another RM 
which is called ROUTE REPLY (RREP), will be originated by the destination node. The 
intermediate nodes who have, in their routing table, an entire route towards that destination 
node also can immediately reply to the RREQ originated by the source node (known as 
gratitude reply and it is an optional feature of AODVv2). Both the RREQ and the RREP 
have the same uniform structure. When a route is added to the route cache of a node, a 
Ttimeout field will be set for that route. This means that after Ttimeout this route will be deleted 
from the route cache.  
iii. Route Error Phase 
An intermediate node may originate an RM, called an ROUTE ERROR (RERR), in 
the two main scenarios. In the first case, the intermediate node does not have a valid route 
for the destination of a received data packet and consequently the packet is undeliverable. 
In the second case, the intermediate node detects a link breakage, as shown in figure 3.4. 
3.1.3 Routing Mechanism of Energy Efficient AODVv2 (E2AODVv2) 
The inherent benefits of AODVv2 due to standardized control packets following IETF 
uniform packet formats and the capability to support IPv6 suggest that this protocol will 
have a strong legacy in ad hoc networks. Therefore, if we are to pursue energy efficient 
operation for routing in ad hoc networks, then exploring AODVv2 as the fundamental 
building block can be potentially a springboard for promoting significant energy savings in 
the network. In this section, we describe our proposed approach to increase the energy 
efficiency of AODVv2. 
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Figure  3.4:  A sample of RERR phase in AODVv2 
3.1.3.1 Routing messages in E2AODVv2 
E2AODVv2 introduces two new fields for each routing message which are discussed 
in this section. 
i. Energy Field 
Suppose that for a communication between a source and a destination node there are N 
routes and the number of nodes in ith route, called Routei, is Mi (as shown in figure 3.5). In 
E2AODVV2, each kth node in Routei, has a battery power (BPk) level quantified as 16 
different values (from 0 to 15).  
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Figure  3.5:  Multiple routes between source and destination 
Moreover, there is a Critical Battery Power Level (CBPL) whose default value is 3 
(CBPL=3). Therefore node  node k in Routei,, which has a BP of less than CBPL, is 
suffering from energy depletion and is considered as a critical node in terms of battery 
power (i.e., ^! < `^). Critical nodes should not be selected for packet forwarding in 
E2AODVv2.  
The Energy field of RREQ in E2AODVv2 has three cells: TotBat, MinBat, and 
CritBat.  TotBati is the summation of the total battery power level of all nodes of Routei, as 
foloows: 
a^ = ∑ ^!!bK?!bO       ( 3.1) 
The MinBati cell in the energy field of RREQi shows the minimum value of BP for all 
nodes in Routei, whilst CritBati shows the number of nodes which have a BP less than 
CBPL in Routei.  
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Figure  3.6: D originates route replies (RREP) toward S in AODVv2 
Figure 3.6 shows a network based on the previous sample that has a simpler topology. 
In this example, there are 8 nodes. The battery power level and the traffic parameter of all 
these nodes are given in Table  3.1 (the traffic parameter will be introduced later in this 
section). Based on Table  3.1, the energy and the traffic parameters of all paths of the 
network in figure 3.6 are calculated and given by Table  3.2.  
For example, as the first column of Table  3.2 shows, the first path (i=1) from S to D 
(i.e., S-C-I-D) has one node with a critical battery level (CritBat=1); the minimum battery 
power level of all nodes in this path is 2 which belongs to node C, as shown in Table  3.1 
(MinBat=2); the total battery power level of all nodes in this path is 12 (TotBat=12), and 
the number of intermediate nodes in this path is 2 (M=2).  
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Node Battery Power 
(BP) 
Traffic Parameter 
(TP) 
A 6 0.7 
B 8 0.5 
C 2 0.8 
F 12 0.3 
I 10 0.6 
G 5 0.9 
H 14 0.4 
Table  3.1: Battery power level and traffic parameter of all nodes of the network in 
Figure  3.6 
For this network, the original AODVv2 chooses the shortest path (i.e., the first path S-
C-I-D); however, the new proposed protocol, E2AODVv2, will choose the second path 
(i.e., S-A-B-F-H-D), which is a stronger alternative in terms of energy efficiency and even 
load balancing which  is discussed later on. 
ii. Traffic Field 
In figure 3.5, if the queue size of the interface of node k located in Routei is AQk and 
the maximum queue size is MQk, then the traffic parameter of node k in E2AODVv2 (i.e., 
TPk ) will be calculated as follows: 
! = :cdKcd      ( 3.2) 
The Traffic field of RREQ has two cells: TotTra and MaxTra. The first one is the 
summation of all traffic parameter in Routei,, as defined by:   
a = ∑ !!bK?!bO      ( 3.3) 
The second one, i.e., MaxTrai, is the maximum TP values of Routei. The traffic 
parameters of all nodes of the network, which is presented in figure 3.6, is given by 
Table  3.1 whilst the traffic parameters of all paths is given in Table  3.2.    
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For example, as the first column of Table  3.2 shows, for the first path (i=1) from S to 
D (i.e., S-C-I-D), the total traffic parameter of all intermediate nodes is 1.4 (i.e., TotTra = 
1.4) and the maximum traffic parameter is 0.4 (i.e., MaxTra = 0.4) which belongs to node 
C as shown in Table  3.1. Also, M is the number of intermediate (relay) nodes in a path, 
e.g., the first path S-C-I-D, has two intermediate nodes; therefore M=2.  
Path S-C-I-D S-A-B-F-H-D S-A-B-G-D 
Path Number i=1 i=2 i=3 
CritBat 1 0 0 
TotBat 12 40 19 
MinBat 2 6 5 
M 2 4 3 
TotTra 1.4 1.9 1.8 
MaxTra 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Table  3.2: Energy and traffic features of all networks nodes in figure 3.6 
Dest. 
Add. 
Route 
Seq. 
Num. 
Hop 
Count 
Next 
Hop 
Life 
Time 
(ms) 
Last 
Used 
(ms) 
Forward 
Flag 
Broken 
Flag 
… 
D   112 3 I 30000 10000 T F … 
E   36 2 S 20000 15000 T F … 
K   76 4 I 50000 1000 T F … 
… … … … …  … … … 
Table  3.3: A sample routing table for E2AODV2 
Therefore, in E2AODVv2, when the intermediate node k receives RREQ, it updates 
TotTrai and MaxTrai of the traffic field of the RREQ and forwards the RREQ toward the 
next node. A sample node routing table is shown in Table  3.3. 
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3.1.3.2 Route selection process 
In E2AODVv2, when a destination node receives several RREQs from different 
routes, as in figure 3.5, it runs a route selection process to determine the best route in terms 
of energy and traffic parameters.  
i. Calculating Energy Parameter of a route in E2AODVv2 
The energy parameter of Routei,, called E(i), indicates the priority of the Routei, in 
terms of  the battery power level as presented by: 
 = PW()K?×eQfW      ( 3.4) 
Where Mi is the number of nodes in Routei, TotBat(i) is the total battery power level of 
all nodes in Routei, as presented in equation 3.1, and InitialBat is the initial battery power 
level of a node (which is preset to the same value for all nodes). In some scenarios, a route 
may have a few nodes with a very low energy level; this route should be avoided due to 
these bottleneck nodes. Therefore, the negative impact of MinBat(i) (which is the 
minimum battery power level of Routei) should be applied to E(i ), as given by:  
 = PW()×KQW()K?×eQfWg       ( 3.5) 
As mentioned before, CritBat(i) identifies the number of nodes in Routei which have 
reached a critical battery level and hence should be avoided from packet relaying functions 
(otherwise, the route is likely to break down ). A large value for CritBat(i) triggers an alert 
that this route has several nodes with a critical battery level. Consequently, E(i) can be 
revised to reflect also the negative impact of these nodes in Routei. The final E(i) of a route 
in E2AODVv2 will be calculated based on equation 3.6. When a destination node receives 
an RREQ, it can calculate   via the energy field of the RREQ.  
 = PW()×KQW()K?×eQfWg×(V%W()NO)     ( 3.6) 
ii. Calculating route Traffic parameter in E2AODVv2 
A route with a lower traffic metric cost has a higher priority in the routing process of 
E2AODVv2. Nevertheless, a route may have a low overall traffic metric even if one of its 
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nodes is overloaded with traffic thus creating a bottleneck, and should be potentially 
avoided. The traffic parameter of Routei is shown by T(i) and is calculated by:  
 = P%()×Kh%()K?      ( 3.7) 
Where Mi is the number of nodes in Routei. When a destination node receives an 
RREQ, it can calculate Ti via the traffic field of the RREQ. 
iii. Precedence Function 
The function that determines the precedence of Routei is given by Haia(). This 
function depends on the energy and the traffic parameters of Routei  and is given by:  
Haia() = j??     ( 3.8) 
However, we can choose a trade-off between energy efficiency and traffic balancing, 
but this function is flexible and can be customized by giving a higher weight to the energy 
or traffic parameter. 
3.1.3.3 Routing behaviour of nodes in E2AODVv2 
In E2AODVv2, each node shows different routing behaviour that depends on the role 
of the node in the communication.  
i. Source nodes routing behaviour 
In E2AODVv2, when a source node S wants to start a communication with a 
destination node D, it searches its route cache. If there is a route in the cache toward D the 
source node starts the communication (note that the old route would have expire and 
deleted from the cache automatically). Otherwise, S generates a RREQ message, initializes 
the values of the energy and the traffic fields (they will be set to zero) and floods them into 
the network. 
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ii. Intermediate nodes routing behaviour 
The intermediate nodes who receive the RREQ message, update the energy and traffic 
fields accordingly: 
1. To update the energy field, the intermediate node (that is node k in Routei) adds its 
own BP to the TotBat value. As a next step, the intermediate node, checks the MinBat 
field of the received RREQ message and if it has a BPk less than MinBat, then MinBat 
will be updated by BPk (i.e., if ^! < kl^ then kl^ = ^!). Also if ^! < `^, then CritBat will be increased by one.  
 
2. To update the traffic field, the intermediate node, adds its TPk number to the TotTra 
number. Also, if ! > ko, then MaxTra will be updated by TPk. 
 
However, the intermediate node in traditional AODVv2 will drop the repeated request 
for the same destination and will not forward them anymore, as figure 3.2 shows; but, in 
our protocol the intermediate nodes will forward KInter.forward of these RREQs as well, as 
shown in figure 3.7. Also intermediate node replies to the new coming RREQs only in 
KInter.timout seconds. The received RREQ messages are saved in a RREQ table. E2AODVv2 
uses the current tables and structures of AODVv2.  KInter.forward is set to 3 and KInter.timout is 
set to 2 seconds in E2AODVv2. 
iii. Destination nodes routing behaviour 
When a destination node receives n RREQs from different n routes, by extracting the 
required information from RREQ, it can calculate the RoutePriority for all these RREQs 
and finally the route which has the best RoutePriority will be chosen.  
Figure 3.8 shows the role of the source, the intermediate and the destination nodes in 
the communication. Each route request, such as RREQi,, should be initialized by the source 
node. It will pass from one node to another within the route, and each node has the 
opportunity to update the energy and traffic fields accordingly (where each route will have 
Mi intermediate nodes). It finally reaches the destination node which is responsible for 
running the Precedence Function, finding the best route and initializing the RREP. 
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Therefore, via this distributed mechanism, the nodes in E2AODVv2 can cooperatively 
balance the load in the network, in terms of traffic and battery power consumption.  
 
 
Figure  3.7:  A sample of RREQ phase in E2AODVv2 
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Figure  3.8:  the routing behaviour of source, intermediate, and destination nodes in 
E2AODVv2. 
3.1.4 Evaluating E2AODVv2 
3.1.4.1 Analytical analysis of E2AODVv2 
The traditional AODVv2 for the network in figure 3.6 chooses the first path (i=1) from 
S to D (i.e., S-C-I-D). The battery power level and the traffic parameter of all these nodes 
are given in Table  3.1. Also based on Table  3.1, the energy parameter, the traffic 
parameters, and the priority of all paths of the network in figure 3.6 are calculated and 
given in Table  3.4.  
Initialize and 
send RREQ
Update and 
Forward RREQ
Initialize and
send RREP
Source 
Intermediate 
Destination 
Update Energy Field 
     TotBati, MinBati, and CritBati 
 Update Traffic Field  
     TotTrai and MaxTrai 
Calculate Ei 
Calculate Ti 
Calculate RoutePriority(i) : 
Find Best Route 
Energy Field Initialization: 
   TotBati=0 
   MinBati=0 
   CritBati=0 
Traffic Field Initialization: 
   TotTrai=0 
   MaxTrai=0 
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Figure  3.9:  A sample of RREP phase in E2AODVv2 
Path S-C-I-D S-A-B-F-H-D S-A-B-G-D 
Path Number i=1 i=2 i=3 
CritBat 1 0 0 
TotBat 12 40 19 
MinBat 2 6 5 
M 2 4 3 
E 0.026 0.26 0.14 
TotTra 1.4 1.9 1.8 
MaxTra 0.8 0.7 0.7 
T 0.56 0.3325 0.63 
RoutePrio (E/T) 0.046 0.781 0.22 
Best Path × √ × 
Table  3.4: The energy and traffic features of all paths in the network of figure 3.9 
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Our proposed E2AODVv2 protocol, based on Table  3.4, chooses the second path path 
(i.e., S-A-B-F-H-D), which provides equal priority towards reducing energy and balancing 
traffic load. Therefore, E2AODVv2 send RREP messages through this optimized path as 
shown by figure 3.9. 
3.1.4.2 Performance metrics 
We use Two-Ray Ground Reflection Model which considers both the direct path and a 
ground reflection path between two mobile nodes. Also all nodes in the network move 
based on the Random Way Point Mobility Model. In this movement model, a mobile node 
starts its travel from a random location inside the topology area after pausing for a certain 
period of time (called “pause time”). After the initial pause time, the mobile node chooses 
another random location inside the topology area and moves toward this new location by a 
speed that is uniformly distributed between a predefined minimum and maximum speed. 
Upon arrival, the mobile node pauses again for the pause time and repeats the previous 
process again till the simulation time has expired [35, 53]. 
The simulation results presented in this chapter were obtained using the ns-2 simulator 
[54]. Traffic sources are CBR (Constant Bit Rate) and the packet sending rate at the source 
nodes is 8 packets per second. Table  3.5 presents a summary of the parameters for the 
simulated scenarios (movement and traffic files). We evaluated the proposed protocol 
using five metrics: i) balancing energy consumption, ii) scalability, iii) network lifetime, v) 
node’s failure level, and iv) jitter. 
i. Balancing Energy Consumption 
This metric will allow measuring the effectiveness of the energy balancing algorithm 
used by E2AODVv2. Let us denote the energy load of all the nodes in the network 
consisting of N nodes, is a set  = {()  ∈  :  = 1, … , }. 
Where element of this set, e.g., (), is calculated as ratio of the consumed energy 
node i to the total aggregate energy consumed in all the nodes, including node i. That is, 
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() = VPQT#IjQ%Ru()PfVPQT#IjQ%Ru     ( 3.9) 
Having calculated all N elements of the , we can now calculate the standard 
deviation of  for a network consisting of N nodes (i.e., j;" ).  The value of j;"  will be our 
energy balancing metric for comparing different protocols; the smaller the j;" , the more 
effective the energy balancing capability. 
Parameters of movement model I, characterized by number of nodes 
Topology area 500m × 500m 
Maximum mobility of nodes 5 m/s 
Number of nodes 1…20 
Simulation time 300s 
Parameters of movement model II, characterized by simulation time 
Topology area 500m × 500m 
Maximum mobility of nodes 5 m/s 
Number of nodes 20 
Simulation time 200…1800s 
Parameters of traffic model 
Traffic sources CBR 
Data packets size 512 bytes 
Sending rate 8 packets/second 
Table  3.5: Parameters of movement models and communication model  
ii. Scalability 
Another interesting metric is the scalability of the proposed protocol in terms of load 
balancing; i.e., if the proposed protocol can balance the load of the network when we 
increase the number of network nodes (i.e., N in our settings). For this purpose we change 
the number of nodes N (the network size) to a maximum number (which is 20 in our 
setting, based on Table  3.5) and calculate the related j;"  for each network size. 
 
56 
 
iii. Network lifetime 
Network lifetime is another important metric that reflect the load balancing capability 
of the routing protocol; the bigger the lifetime, the more effective the energy balancing 
capability. To compare the lifetime of the proposed protocol with other protocols, we take 
two parameters into consideration: i) failure time v%T (the time that the first node in the 
network ran out of battery power) and ii) last failure time fT.  
iv. Node failure level 
Finally the last performance metric that we use is the node failure level, which 
determines the capability of E2AODVv2 in keeping nodes alive for longer durations. The 
node failure level, for a time window T, is the percentage of nodes in the topology that 
have failed due to a depleted battery. This value is calculated as follows: 
aG i ] =  #vfI_QPIT_Q_#QPIT_Q_PPfPRu     ( 3.10) 
v. Jitter 
In a data transmission between a pair of source and sink nodes, jitter is the variation in 
the time between packets arriving at the source node. Let us assume that at time Si the 
source node sends packet   and the sink node receives it at time Ri. The jitter of packet  
is calculated as follows:  
L  = |(HNO . H) . (FNO . F)| = |(HNO . FNO) . (H . F)|  ( 3.11) 
During the entire simulation time, in a communication between a pair of source and 
sink nodes, there are M streams of packets, each stream consisting of P packets. We 
studied the average jitter of all streams of data in the network. 
3.1.4.3 Simulation results 
This section presents the simulation results for the comparison between two reactive 
protocols AODV and DSR that are considered baselines in this work, against our proposed 
E2AODVv2 protocol. 
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i. Simulation results regarding balancing energy consumption and scalability 
For this metric, simulation results are presented in terms of the capability of our 
approach to balance battery power (energy) consumption.  The traffic model is the one 
presented in Table  3.5 with the following variants: 
i. Distributed traffic amongst nodes: traffic sources and destinations will be chosen 
randomly in time. This Variant is shown by “Distributed” in Table  3.6. 
ii. Concentrated traffic with overloaded nodes: traffic destinations will be predefined 
(all traffic in the network goes toward those sink nodes). This variant is shown by 
“Concentrated” in Table  3.6. 
 j;Ox 
Distributed 
j;Ox 
Concentrated 
v%T 
Distributed 
(second) 
v%T 
Concentrated 
(second) 
fT 
Distributed 
(second) 
fT 
Concentrated 
(second) 
E2AODVv2 0.029 0.085 500 500 1700 1800 
DSR 0.045 0.182 400 400 1700 1500 
AODV 0.05 0.202 300 300 1400 1300 
Table  3.6: Balancing Energy Consumption metric j;" , the first failure time v%T (s), 
and  the last failure time fT (s), for both Distributed and Concentrated traffic modes.  
The metric for energy consumption balancing in a network consisting of N nodes is j;"  as discussed earlier. As a sample, the value of j;"  for the network consists of 12 nodes 
(i.e., j;Ox) is marked  in figure 3.10; per different protocols for the distributed traffic mode 
and similarly in figure 3.11 for the Concentrated traffic mode. Also, Table  3.6 summarizes 
these sample values for j;Ox.  
Furthermore, the value of j;"  decreases as the network size N increases, 
demonstrating the scalability of the protocols as shown in figure 3.10 and figure 3.11 for 
distributed and Concentrated traffic modes, respectively.  
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For the first variant, distributed traffic amongst nodes, all protocols show a similar 
performance (figure 3.10): increasing the number of nodes leads to improved energy 
balancing (lower standard deviation). This can be explained due to the chosen traffic model 
since multiple traffic source/destinations are chosen randomly throughout the simulation, 
and thus more nodes will participate in the routing process.  
 
Figure  3.10:  Balancing of energy consumption (j;" ) and the scalability of protocols 
vs. number of nodes (when distributing traffic amongst nodes). 
For the second variant, that targets concentrated traffic with overloaded nodes, we 
chose n nodes, amongst all network nodes (N), as destination nodes (sink nodes) for the 
generated traffic in the network. The number of n is set to 20% of N, which due to the 
many-to-one traffic patterns, creates overloaded conditions at the destination nodes. 
Simulation results show that in such scenarios, the standard deviation behaviour is similar 
to the previous variant, but with worst performance (figure 3.11). However, as in the 
previous scenario, all three protocols improve in terms of performance as the number of 
nodes in topology increases (figure 3.11). As both figure 3.10 and figure 3.11 show, the 
proposed protocol E2AODVv2 reaches a higher performance in terms of battery power 
efficiency, balancing and scalability in contrast to the baselines. 
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Figure  3.11:  Balancing of energy consumption (j;" ) and the scalability of protocols 
vs. number of nodes (when traffic is concentrated in few nodes)  
ii. Simulation results regarding network lifetime and node failure level 
This metric is measured using movement model II described in Table  3.5. Similar to 
the previous case, here again there are two different traffic models: Distributed traffic 
amongst nodes (figure 3.12) and concentrated traffic with some overloaded nodes (figure 
3.13). We use the first failure time v%T and the last failure time fT as the network 
lifetime metrics.  
The values of v%T and fT are marked in figure 3.12 and figure 3.13 and also 
summarized in Table  3.6. As these results show, E2AODVv2 has always a better value for 
both v%T and fT.  
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Figure  3.12:  Percentage of failed nodes vs. simulation time (when distributing traffic 
amongst nodes) 
Also, as expected, the number of failing nodes increases with simulation time. When 
nodes use E2AODVv2, their lifetime gets extended due to the energy balancing 
capabilities of E2AODVv2 and shows a lower Node failure level (figure 3.12). This feature 
is even more pronounced when traffic is concentrated in a few nodes (figure 3.13). 
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Figure  3.13:  Percentage of failed nodes vs. simulation time (when traffic is 
concentrated in a few nodes) 
iii. Simulation results regarding jitter 
Jitter has several sources such as network congestion, route changes, and delaying 
packets in the buffer queues of the intermediate nodes in a source-sink communication 
session. Usually a jitter buffer is used at sink nodes to counteract the jitter.  
Jitter is a measurement for the quality of the communication; a small jitter indicates a 
high quality communication due to a low latency. As figure 3.14 shows, the performance 
of the proposed protocol is better than DSR and very close to the original AODV. This can 
be explained due to the greater complexity of E2AODVv2 for choosing a route which 
leads to a higher delay. 
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Figure  3.14:  Jitter vs number of nodes 
3.1.5 Conclusions Regarding E2AODVv2 Protocol 
We proposed a new energy efficient and traffic balancing routing protocol based on 
the well-known IETF AODVv2 protocol, a popular approach for routing in ad hoc 
networks. The protocol uses a standard generalized MANET Packet/Message format. The 
E2AODVv2 has been enhanced with battery power efficiency and balancing capability, 
that can detect the nodes that reach a critical battery level in the network and switch the 
route in order to avoid network fragmentation and to achieve a higher network lifetime. 
The same behaviour is also fulfilled when bottlenecks are detected in a specific route in 
terms of traffic load.  These additional functionalities are achieved without the need to 
create new disruptive approach in the protocol messages. E2AODVv2 achieves a higher 
performance with respect to energy consumption balancing, scalability, network lifetime, 
and the percentage of failed nodes in comparison to well-known baseline protocols such 
AODV and DSR and a jitter value very close to the AODV. As shown by the simulation 
results, the E2AODVv2 routing protocol specifically outperforms in scenarios where the 
load of the network is not balanced. 
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3.2 Load Balanced Dynamic Source Routing (LBDSR) 
In previous section we proposed E2AODVv2, a new energy efficient and load 
balanced routing protocol for ad hoc networks. In this section, we propose a 
complimentary solution for load balancing and energy efficiency operation in ad hoc 
networks called Load balanced Dynamic Source Routing (LBDSR). 
3.2.1 Introduction  
DSR [27] is a reactive (On demand) source routing protocol that was proposed in the 
infancy of wireless ad hoc networks. Several current ad hoc routing protocols are based on 
DSR main approach[34]. Here, we apply the energy efficiency and load balancing 
approach that was proposed in the previous approach toward DSR, propose a new routing 
protocol called Load balanced Dynamic Source Routing (LBDSR); that is more energy 
efficient and load balanced.  LBDSR aims to be usable not only for MANETs, but also for 
ad hoc sensor networks who have limited resources. Energy efficiency is of great 
importance in sensor ad hoc networks due to limitations in terms of battery, memory and 
processing power.  
LBDSR has multipath capability and the intermediate nodes, located in a route 
between a source and a destination node, are able to extract additional information from 
the traversing control packets. It uses a new structure for control packets, changes the 
routing behavior in the nodes, and creates a whole new algorithm for route cache and 
selection. Although we opt to use DSR, the same principle is applicable for other current 
flat ad hoc routing protocols. The position of LBDSR in ad hoc routing protocols 
categories is illustrated by figure 3.1. 
3.2.2 Revised Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
LBDSR uses a modified version of dynamic source routing approach that was 
discussed in Section  2.1.1. All routing operations in this approach can be categorized into 
three phases as figure 3.15 shows: 
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i. Route Request Phase 
In a communication between a source node (S) and a destination node (D), S 
originates a Route REQest (RREQ) message, and broadcasts this to all of its neighbours. 
These RREQs are then flooded in the network until they reach D. An intermediate node, 
which does not know the route to D, should forward the RREQ to its neighbours. The 
intermediate node will also drop the repeated request for the same destination and will not 
forward them anymore, as shown by figure 3.16.  
ii. Route Reply Phase 
As illustrated in figure 3.17, when the RREQs finally reach the destination node, 
another control message, which is called Route REPly (RREP), will be originated by the 
destination node. The intermediate nodes who have, in their route cache, an entire route 
towards that destination node also can immediately reply to the RREQ originated by the 
source node (known as optional gratitude reply). If the RREQ is repeated, it will be 
dropped. If none of the above cases occur, the intermediate node forwards the RREQ to its 
neighbours. 
iii. Route Error Phase 
An intermediate node may originate a control message, called a Route ERRor 
(RERR), in the two main scenarios. In the first case, the intermediate node does not have a 
valid route for the destination of a received data packet and consequently the packet is 
undeliverable. In the second case, the intermediate node detects a link breakage, as shown 
in figure 3.18. All the nodes, including the source host, that are notified with the RERR 
packet, will remove all routes in their route cache that use the ‘broken’ link.  
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Figure  3.15: Three phases of source 
routing 
 
Figure  3.16: Route discovery phase by 
RREQ control message 
 
Figure  3.17: Route establishing by 
RREP control message 
 
Figure  3.18: Route error message by 
RERR control message 
Initialize and 
send RREQ
Update and 
Forward RREQ
Initialize and
send RREP
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3.2.3 Routing Mechanism of LBDSR 
3.2.3.1 Structure of control packets 
LBDSR protocol has three main control packets that are Route REQest (RREQ), 
Route REPly (RREP), and Route ERRor (RERR). This section describes these control 
messages in more details. 
i. Structure of RREQ in LBDSR 
The RREQ control message of LBDSR, like DSR, has several fields such as: 
1. pktType: generally can be the RREQ or RREP or RERR. 
2. seqNumber: unique identifier number of RREQ that is generated by the source node 
3. D: destination address 
4. S: source address 
5. Path: nodes that the RREQ passs to reach the current node [21]. The path of current 
RREQ is the IPv4 address of all passed through nodes. 
6. HopCount: number of intermediate nodes that RREQ passes through. The 
maximum number of intermediate nodes allowed to forward that copy of the RREQ 
is HopLimit [21]. 
7. Energy filed: discussed in Section  3.1.3. 
8. Traffic filed: discussed in Section  3.1.3. 
The structure of RREQ in LBDSR is shown in figure 3.19. 
typedef struct 
{ 
DSR_PacketType pktType; //will be RREQ 
NODE_ADDR srcAddr; 
NODE_ADDR targetAddr; 
int seqNumber; 
int hopCount; 
NODE_ADDR path[HopLimit]; 
int TotBat, MinBat, and CritBat; //energy parameters 
int TotTra and MaxTra;//traffic parameters 
} LBDSR_RouteRequest; 
Figure  3.19: Structure of RREQ control packet in LBDSR 
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i. Structure of RREP in LBDSR: 
The RREP control message of LBDSR has a similar structure to RREQ, as illustrated 
by figure 3.20. 
typedef struct 
{ 
DSR_PacketType pktType; //will be RREP 
NODE_ADDR srcAddr; 
NODE_ADDR targetAddr; 
int seqNumber; 
int hopCount; 
NODE_ADDR path[HopLimit]; 
int TotBat, MinBat, and CritBat; //energy parameters 
int TotTra and MaxTra;//traffic parameters  
} LBDSR_RouteReply; 
Figure  3.20: Structure of RREP control packet in LBDSR 
ii. Structure of RERR in LBDSR 
The structure of RRER in LBDSR is the same as in DSR [21], as illustrated by figure 
3.21. 
typedef struct 
{ 
DSR_PacketType pktType; //will be RERR 
NODE_ADDR srcAddr; //*Originator of the Route Error*/ 
NODE_ADDR destAddr;//*Source of the broken route*/ 
NODE_ADDR unreachableAddr;//*Immediate downstream of broken link*/ 
int hopCount; 
BOOL salvaged; 
NODE_ADDR path[HopLimit]; 
} LBDSR_RouteError; 
Figure  3.21: Structure of RERR control packet in LBDSR 
3.2.3.2 Routing behavior of nodes 
The routing behavior of the nodes in the LBDSR remains like E2AODVv2, as 
discussed in Section  3.1.3. Some of these parameters are summarized in Table  3.7. These 
parameters were discussed in Section 3.1.3. 
The route selection process of LBDSR is similar to E2AODVv2 that was discussed in 
Section  3.1.3. As a reminder, the route priority function that determines the priority of 
Routei between S and D in figure 3.5 in E2AODVv2 was calculated by the following 
equation: 
68 
 
Haia() = j??     ( 3.12) 
 
Parameter Definition Value 
KInter.forward 
The maximum number of RREQs (generated by S toward D and 
belonging to the same flow) that can be forwarded by an 
intermediate node. 
3 
TInter.Wait 
An intermediate node only forwards the RREQs (generated by S 
toward D and belonging to the same flow) before this timeout. 
2s 
CBPL Critical Battery Power Level 3 
Table  3.7: Some parameters which define the routing behavior of the nodes in LBDSR 
Both Ei and Ti parameters were discussed previously in Section  3.1.3. The route 
priority function that determines the priority of Routei between S and D in figure 3.5 for 
LBDSR is: 
Haia() = yz×j?y{×;?Ny|×?     ( 3.13) 
Where Li is the length parameter of Routei and shows the priority of route i with 
respect to the length of the Routei: 
Haia() = : #f_;QR}_XP#?~_      ( 3.14) 
Where Actual_Length_Route(i) is the actual length of route Routei (i.e., the number of 
hops in route i) and Max_Length is the maximum length that a route can take in DSR 
routing protocols.  
KE, KL, and KT are the coefficients of energy, length, and traffic parameters, 
respectively. In our results, LBDSRL is a customized version of LBDSR for achieving 
better delay and jitter, and LBDSRE is a customized version of LBDSR for achieving better 
energy efficiency. Therefore, we can achieve higher LBDSR performance with regard to 
end-to-end delay and jitter (LBDSRL), or Energy consumption (LBDSRE) by adjusting the 
coefficients KE, KL, and KT, as summarized by Table  3.8.  
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Protocol name KE KL  KT   
LBDSR 1 1 1 
LBDSRL 1 2 1 
LBDSRE 2 1 1 
Table  3.8: Different customized versions of LBDSR by adjusting the coefficient KE, 
KL, and KT 
Other alternative functions can be also used without impacting the generality of the 
proposed approach. Based on a variety of workloads and scenarios for simulation, the 
coefficient of parameters can be determined to be a trade-off for improving end-to-end 
delay, traffic balancing, and power consumption balancing all together. 
3.2.4 Evaluating LBDSR 
This section presents ns2 simulation results for LBDSR protocol. The movement and 
communication models are summarized in Table  3.9. LBDSR is evaluated according to the 
following metrics: average jitter, balancing of energy consumption, and node’s failure 
level.  
i. Simulation results regarding jitter 
Regarding  Jitter, values of 20 msec to 50 msec can be acceptable for the average jitter 
value based on the type of the services (real time or stream) and QoS metrics [72]. All 
analysed protocols present an ascending profile when the number (figure 3.22) or the 
mobility of nodes (figure 3.23) are increased.  
As expected, AODV performs better than DSR and LBDSR. Both are reactive 
protocols; the first uses a normal routing approach while the latter is a source routing 
protocol. Source routing protocols normally present longer delay and jitter because their 
route discovery takes more time, as every intermediate node tries to extract information 
before forwarding the reply, and because data packets are forwarded hop by hop through 
the path using the source routing method. 
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Parameters of movement model I, characterized by number of nodes 
Topology area 500m × 500m 
Maximum mobility of nodes 5 m/s 
Number of nodes 1…20 
Simulation time 300s 
Parameters of movement model II, characterized by maximum node speed 
Topology area 500m × 500m 
Maximum mobility of nodes 0m/s…5m/s 
Simulation time 300s 
Number of nodes 20 
Parameters of movement model III, characterized by simulation time 
Topology area 500m × 500m 
Maximum mobility of nodes 5 m/s 
Number of nodes 20 
Simulation time 200…1300s 
Parameters of traffic model 
Traffic sources CBR 
Data packets size 512 bytes 
Sending rate 8 packets/second 
Table  3.9: Parameters of movement models and communication model 
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Figure  3.22:  Jitter vs. number of nodes 
 
Figure  3.23:  Jitter vs. mobility 
As mentioned before, LBDSR Route Priority function can be customized to choose 
routes that minimize jitter and end-to-end delay by using a higher coefficient for the length 
parameter (KL). The behaviour of this version of LBDSR is shown in both figure 3.22 and 
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figure 3.23 as LBDSRL. Therefore, as the figures suggest, the LBDSRL protocol has a 
better average jitter in comparison to AODV, original DSR, and LBDSR. The maximum 
and minimum average of LBDSRL is shown by the purple dot which varies around the 
average jitter value of LBDSRL. 
ii. Simulation results regarding balancing energy consumption and scalability 
For this metric, simulation results are presented in terms of battery power (energy) 
consumption balancing.  Also, the energy parameter (KE) of LBDSR Route Priority 
function can be customized to achieve higher energy efficiency; this version of LBDSR is 
called by LBDSRE in the simulation results that follow. The traffic model is the one 
presented in Table  3.9 with the following variants: 
i. Distributed traffic amongst nodes: traffic sources and destinations will be chosen 
randomly in time. 
ii. Concentrated traffic with overloaded nodes: traffic destinations will be predefined 
(all traffic in the network goes toward those sink nodes). 
These two variants were discussed before in Section  3.1.4. 
For the first variant, distributed traffic amongst nodes, all protocols achieve similar 
performance (figure 3.24), obtaining a higher balancing (low standard deviation) for 
energy consumption as the number of nodes increases. This can be explained due to the 
chosen traffic model; since multiple traffic source/destinations are chosen randomly 
throughout the simulation, more nodes will participate in the routing process.  
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Figure  3.24:  Balancing of energy consumption (j;" ) vs. number of nodes (when 
distributing traffic amongst nodes). 
 
Figure  3.25:  Balancing of energy consumption (j;" ) vs. mobility of nodes (when 
distributing traffic amongst nodes). 
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Figure  3.26:  Balancing of energy consumption (j;" ) and the scalability of protocols 
vs. number of nodes (when traffic is concentrated in few nodes)  
 
Figure  3.27:  Balancing of energy consumption (j;" ) vs. mobility of nodes (when 
traffic is concentrated in few nodes)  
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By increasing mobility, we also achieve better balancing in the energy consumption 
(figure 3.25). Increasing mobility implies a more dynamic topology, in which almost all 
nodes participate in the routing process. Having such condition leads to equality in energy 
consumption leading to a low standard deviation. 
Comparing both figure 3.24 and figure 3.25, we can see that by increasing the 
mobility, all protocols perform a little worse; this can be explained by the fact that greater 
mobility leads to more broken links decreasing the stability of the routing paths. This 
behaviour results in a worse delivery ratio and, as a result, greater retransmissions and 
energy consumption. 
 For the second variant, concentrated traffic with overloaded nodes, we chose n nodes 
amongst all network nodes (N), as destination nodes (sink nodes) for the generated traffic 
in the network. The number of n is set to 20% of N, which due to the many-to-one traffic 
pattern creates an overload condition at the destination nodes. 
Simulation results show that in such a scenario, the standard deviation behaviour is 
similar to the previous variant, but with worse performance (figure 3.26 and figure 3.27). 
As in the previous scenario and for the same reasons, the performance of all three protocols 
improves as the number of nodes in topology increases (figure 3.26). The same applies 
when mobility is increased (figure 3.27). 
iii. Simulation results regarding network lifetime and node failure level 
This metric is measured using movement model III, described in Table  3.9. Like in the 
previous case, again we have two different traffic models: Distributed traffic amongst 
nodes (figure 3.28) and concentrated traffic with overloaded nodes (figure 3.29). The 
percentage of failed nodes = 0 means none of the nodes have failed and the percentage of 
failed nodes=100 means all of them have failed. As expected, the number of failing nodes 
increases as simulation time increases.  
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Figure  3.28:  Percentage of failed nodes vs. simulation time (when distributing traffic 
amongst nodes) 
 
Figure  3.29:  Percentage of failed nodes vs. simulation time (when traffic is 
concentrated in a few nodes) 
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When nodes use LBDSR, their lifetime gets extended due to the energy balancing 
capabilities of LBDSR. This is even more clear for the energy shaped LBDSRE, especially 
when traffic is concentrated in a few nodes (figure 3.29). 
3.2.5 Conclusions Regarding LBDSR Protocol 
We modified the control packets, routing tables, and the route selection method 
resulting in the enhanced Load Balanced Dynamic Source Routing (LBDSR) approach. 
Performance statistics with respect to traffic load balancing, energy consumption 
balancing, average end-to-end delay, and route’s reliability metrics were measured. As 
shown by the simulation results, the LBDSR protocol outcomes legacy approaches 
specially in scenarios where the load of network is not balanced. Also LBDSR can be 
customized to operate in different network scenarios to either to be more energy efficient, 
or to be jitter and delay aware. In this case, LBDSR shows an improvement of up to 30% 
with respect to these metrics. The proposed approach is technology agnostic and can apply 
to any legacy reactive routing protocols. 
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4 Network Codes for Multi-hop Networking Technology 
Network Coding is a promising technique that combines several input packets into several 
output packets, thus improving the throughput and energy consumption. Due to the multi-
hop approach of ad hoc networks and the broadcast nature of the wireless channels, the 
store-code-forward approach of NC can complement the ad routing protocols in the 
network layer. NC can reduce the number of transmissions in unicast and multicast 
communications and the number of re-transmissions in lossy networks whilst increasing 
the data transfer rate. All these capabilities directly translate to greater energy saving per 
transferred bit of data. However, due to the role of intermediate nodes in processing 
(coding) of the transitive packets, network coding can have either positive or negative 
security aspects. Eavesdropping attack and packet corruption (by erroneous channels or 
byzantine intermediate attacker nodes) have a severe effect on NC based systems 
performance and its integrity. This chapter presents the state of the art in security 
mechanisms for NC based systems, the taxonomy of current mitigations techniques, and 
finally proposes two novel mitigation techniques against eavesdropping attack and packet 
corruption in NC based systems. 
4.1 Introduction 
Network coding (NC) [5] constitutes a capacity achieving solution to packet 
multicasting. In the store-code-forward paradigm of NC systems, the source messages are 
not only something to be merely routed, but are subject to algebraic operations resulting in 
encoded packets. This contrasts with current state-of-the-art routing solutions, where 
source messages are merely routed from source to destination.   
In 2003, [73] demonstrated that linear operations at the nodes were sufficient to 
achieve the max-flow min-cut bound: linear network coding (LNC) was defined in directed 
CHAPTER 4 
80 
 
acyclic networks with single-source multicast. Side by side, [74] provided an algebraic 
formulation of linear network coding and demonstrated equivalent results in the new 
framework for both acyclic and cyclic networks. This algebraic formulation opened the 
way to Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC) [75], a type of network codes in which 
the coefficients of linear combinations are randomly chosen over a finite field.  
4.1.1 Principles of Random Linear Network Coding 
In the RLNC approach, the source generates a linear combination of its original 
packets using coefficients in a finite field chosen uniformly at random from the elements of 
the field. Intermediate nodes, on the other hand, perform this random linear combination 
using the coded packets previously received and that stored in the node's buffer [76] . 
RLNC enables distributed NC protocols in which a node without any network state 
information can randomly and independently choose a set of coefficients to perform a 
linear combination of two or more received data packets, and then sends the resulting 
coded packet(s) to its output links.  This operation was proven to be asymptotically optimal 
with the field size [75].  
However, the capability of designing network codes without knowledge about the 
network is paid in terms of successful decoding probability: in fact, in randomised 
scenarios, the capability of a receiver to completely decode the information depends on the 
number of sinks and the size of the finite field. This also introduces a trade-off between the 
decoding error probability and the complexity of the coding operations over the finite field. 
In case of an acyclic network, the lower bound on the successful decoding probability is 
T = (1 . I)|j|, where G is the number of destinations,  is the size of the finite field and E 
is the set of edges. The value of the probability approaches 1 when  → ∞ [77]. Figure 4.1 
shows T versus number of edges for different number of sink nodes in the network where  = 256.  
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Figure  4.1:  T vs. number of edges 
Figure 4.2 shows a representation of a random linear network code in the butterfly 
network with correlated source processes. Either all the coefficients of the linear 
combinations or a part of them are randomly chosen over a finite field of size q. In 
particular, X denotes the source processes, Y the processes at the edges, and Z the ones 
collected by the sinks. Matrices A and B are random matrices that contains the coefficients, 
matrix F is the adjacency matrix of the directed labelled line graph [74]. The transfer 
matrix of the system is M. 
The randomized approach of RLNC is distributed, easier to implement than LNC, and 
especially suitable for changing topologies, large networks or in the presence of 
dynamically varying connections, e.g., ad hoc networks. The key characteristic of RLNC is 
that coefficients of linear combinations are chosen randomly over a finite field. This 
implies the transmission of coding vectors to the receivers by appending them as an 
overhead to the header of the messages. This overhead is quantified as ℎ log , where h is 
the number of information flows at the source and q is the size of the finite field [77].  
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Figure  4.2:  an example of random linear network code in a butterfly scenario 
In general, RLNC can be designed in practice according to two main approaches, 
called respectively intra-session and inter-session. In the former [78-81], routers combine 
packets belonging to the same session. It is typically used in multicast application and in 
case of unpredictable topologies, and it has been demonstrated to improve reliability. The 
decoding operations are only performed at the destination. In the latter [82-86], packets 
from distinct flows are mixed when they pass through a common router. This approach is 
especially suitable for unicast applications and static topologies.  
4.1.2 A General Model for RLNC 
figure 4.3 shows a basic scenario based on a line network in which there is a RLNC 
based communication via three nodes:  A source node encodes the native data packets and 
floods them into the network; an intermediate node recodes the incoming encoded packets 
and forwards them toward a sink node, and the sink node decodes the incoming coded 
packets to extract the native packets. Any generalization of NC systems will be based on 
the same three phases as illustrated in figure 4.3. Per each information flow, the source 
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node floods  native data packets by size  into the network. All nodes know the setup 
parameters   and . The required steps for this RLNC based communication are discussed 
in the following: 
i. Source node: encoding operations 
The source generates  native data packets; each of them can be considered as a vector  = O x … T. These  packets could be represented by the following matrix:  
 = OO ⋯ OT⋮ ⋱ ⋮RO ⋯ RT     ( 4.1) 
Where each element ,  = 1,2, … ,  and   = 1,2, … ,  is a symbol in a finite filed ¡ 
by size  (where  = 2); consequently the size of matrix  is  ×  ×  (bits). The size 
of filed,  is a design parameter for the RLNC based system. After generating matrix , the 
source node randomly chooses l ×  symbols from ¡ (each symbol by probability 1∕ ) 
and forms a coefficient matrix: 
£ = ¤OO ⋯ ¤OR⋮ ⋱ ⋮¤QO ⋯ ¤QR      ( 4.2) 
Then the source node encodes  native packets into l encoded packets (l ≥ ) in a 
form of an RLNC encoded message as follows: 
¥ = £ ×  = ¦OO ⋯ OT⋮ ⋱ ⋮QO ⋯ QT §                   ( 4.3) 
Now, the source node concatenates the coefficient matrix £ as packet header to the 
encoded message ¥ and generates matrix ¨: 
  ¨ = £|¥ = ©OO ⋯ ©ORNT⋮ ⋱ ⋮©QO ⋯ ©QRNT            ( 4.4) 
Finally, the source node sends ¨ to the intermediate node in the scenario illustrated by 
figure 4.3. All the matrices elements and the coding operations in RLNC will remain in ¡. 
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Considerations related to the encoding phase: Matrix ¨ is called generation (also 
called chunk, batch, or class). Each block of data by size B bits may be sent in ℎ 
generations (information flows). Any row of generation matrix ¨ (i.e., ª = « ©O … ©RNT¬,  = 1,2, … , l) is called a codeword. The number of codewords (i.e., l) is another design 
parameter. The sink node finally should receive at least  linear independent codewords to 
be able to extract the  native data packets therefore l ≥  in the source node side.  = l .  determines the redundancy of the RLNC code and ­ =  ∕ l  shows the 
optimality of the code or code rate (0 _ ­ ® 1). Therefore ­ = 0.5 leads to 50% 
redundancy in the code, implying that the transmission rate of the native information is not 
more than 50%. When there are erasure channels in the network, the source node may need 
to produce a higher amount of codewords (i.e., l ≫ ) to  assure that the sink node will 
finally receive sufficient linear independent codewords. This can lead to a higher 
redundancy and lower code rate.  
 
Figure  4.3:  An example of RLNC based system with three mobile nodes: Any 
generalization of NC systems will be based on the same three phases. 
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The coefficients matrix £, that should be created and  interpolated in the header of 
each flow of information, can be considered as an coefficients overhead of RLNC 
algorithm. This overhead is quantified as ℎ log , where ℎ is the number of information 
flows (total generations) at the source and  is the size of the finite field. Unlike RLNC, in 
Linear Network Coding (LNC) mechanism, instead of randomly choosing the coefficients 
(elements of matrix £) from ¡, each node in the network uses its own fixed and pre-
defined coefficients for all the streams of data.   
ii. Intermediate node: recoding operations 
As a possible design for the basic scenario illustrated by figure 4.3, when intermediate 
node receives all l codewords from the source node, it starts the recoding operations. As 
the first step, the intermediate node randomly chooses  × l symbols from ¡ and forms a 
coefficient matrix: 
  ± = GOO ⋯ GOQ⋮ ⋱ ⋮GfO ⋯ GfQ             ( 4.5) 
As the next step, the intermediate node recodes the receiving l codewords into  new 
recoded codewords by the following operations: 
  
´¨ = ± × ¨ = ³OO ⋯ ³ORNT⋮ ⋱ ⋮³fO ⋯ ³fRNT           ( 4.6) 
At the end of this phase, the intermediate node forwards these  new recoded 
codewords (i.e., matrix ´¨) to the sink node. Again, like the encoding phase in the source 
node, the number of new codewords generated by the intermediate nodes in the recoding 
phase (i.e., ) is another design parameter.  
Considerations related to the recoding phase: The intermediate node can apply 
different policies for the recoding operations. Each intermediate node, that has  input and i output links, buffers the input coming codewords. Then it may start the recoding process 
in each time interval like ´ or by having at least µ codewords in its input buffer. Both ´ 
and µ in these different policies are  design parameters and should be determined carefully 
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to minimize delay. Each intermediate node may choose ´ and µ values independent from 
the other nodes. Also, the network may be based on an adhoc networking technology in 
which the topology of the network could be dynamic and the value of  and i can vary 
during the network lifetime. In a general scenario, the intermediate node may receive the 
codewords from different paths. Also, the intermediate node may mix codewords from 
different flows of data (called inter-flow or inter-session network coding), or it can recode 
and mix only the codewords of the same flow (called intra-flow or intra-session network 
coding).  
iii. Sink node: decoding operations 
Each receiving codeword in the sink node has two parts: 1) header: the first  symbols 
of the codeword which are the coefficient symbols. 2) trailer: the last  symbols of each 
codeword which is the real coded packet. As mentioned before, the sink node knows the 
setup parameters   and . The sink node keep checking the rank of the total received 
codewords belonging to the same generation. When the rank of these receiving codewords 
reaches to ; it means that the sink node has received  linear independent codewords 
(called also innovative codewords) and it can immediately start the decoding process. 
Suppose that the sink node forms a matrix by the trailer of the  linear independent 
codewords represented by the following matrix: 
  ¶ = OO ⋯ OT⋮ ⋱ ⋮RO ⋯ RT             ( 4.7) 
Also, the sink node forms a coefficient matrix by the header of these codewords: 
  · = ℎOO ⋯ ℎOR⋮ ⋱ ⋮ℎRO ⋯ ℎRR                           ( 4.8) 
The matrix of coded packets, coefficients, and native packets (i.e., ¶R×T, ·R×R, and R×T , respectively) builds a systems of linear equations like ¶ = · × . Now, the sink 
node, by having ¶ and ·, can extract the  native data packets by solving this system via 
Gaussian elimination method.  Matrix  also can be represented as follows: 
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   = ·<+ × ¶                                         ( 4.9) 
Considerations related to the decoding phase: After successful decoding operations, 
the sink node may send an Ack message back to the source node as a confirmation for 
receiving a generation and requesting the next generation. Beside this optional Ack 
mechanism, another policy could be waiting for a certain amount of time between the 
transmission of the two generations in the source node. 
4.1.3 NC Protocols Categorization 
Different categorizations of NC aware routing protocols for wireless networks, namely 
centralized [87], source routing [88-90], hop-by-hop [78, 82, 91-95], and active [96, 97], 
are presented and reviewed in [6]. In general scene, NC protocols can be classified in two 
main groups based on their use of network state information: 
i) Stateless NC protocols: The stateless NC protocols do not rely on network state 
information such as topology, link cost, and node location, to perform coding operations 
like the mixing of data packets. In stateless NC protocols, nodes do not rely on any 
assumptions about network topology, accordingly coding operations in a communication 
(coding at source node(s), recoding in intermediate node(s), and decoding in sink node(s)) 
are independent from dynamically changing topologies. RLNC is a stateless NC approach 
in which only the sink nodes who have access to sufficient decoding vectors can recover 
native packets [7, 98].  
ii) State-aware NC Protocols: The state-aware NC protocols rely on partial or full 
network state information to optimize the coding operations carried out by each node.  
Here, nodes have some information about network topology; hence, they can use local 
information to achieve the most optimized encryption codes. Also, they can exchange the 
required coding vectors at the beginning of communication. The optimization process in 
the state-aware NC protocols may target the throughput or the delay. The optimization 
process in a node can be based on exchanging information only with close neighbours 
(local optimization) or it can address the end-to-end communication across the entire 
network (global optimization). The COPE [15] protocol, which runs between the IP and 
MAC layers, is a state-aware NC protocol that uses local information and network 
topology information.  
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Table  4.1 lists the benefits and drawbacks of the state-aware and the stateless NC 
protocols especially in terms of security issues. 
Protocol 
Type Key Features Benefits Drawbacks 
Stateless 
NC  
Do not rely on 
network state 
information 
Do not use control 
packets for updating 
their knowledge about 
topology state 
Need more 
sophisticated coding 
operations 
Coding operations 
can work properly 
even under a 
dynamic network 
topology 
More prone against 
wrong network state 
information and invalid 
control traffic packets 
that leads to be more 
immunity against some 
types of fabrication, 
modification, and 
impersonation attacks. 
To guarantee a 
successful decoding, 
coefficients should 
be selected from a 
sufficiently large 
field which increases 
the overhead. 
Nodes chose 
encoding 
coefficients 
randomly and 
independently 
Extracting information 
from received packets in 
receivers is independent 
from the identity of 
sender nodes  
The required 
decoding 
coefficients vector 
should be included 
in the header of each 
data packets.  
State-
aware NC  
Rely on local (one 
or two levels of 
neighbors) or 
global network 
state information 
Instead of including 
encoding coefficient at 
the header of all packets, 
the fixed optimized 
coefficients codes can be 
exchanged at the 
beginning of 
communication. 
Rely on network 
state information, 
routing tables, 
control packets, and 
so on. 
Nodes can use 
network state 
information to 
achieve the most 
optimized 
encoding codes. 
Local or global 
optimization schemes 
Rely on vulnerable 
control packets 
which lead to more 
threats and attacks 
Table  4.1: Benefits and drawbacks of state-aware and stateless NC protocols 
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4.2 Overview of Security Attacks Against NC Systems 
Beside general features such as capability for sending and receiving packets, and being 
equipped with a normal processing power and storage device, such as CPU and memory, 
we expect several rules that should be followed by a well behaved, benign node in a NC 
based system [99, 100]:  
i. Coding: Performing valid coding operations such as mixing, encoding different 
data packets, and contributing actively and correctly in the overall store-code-
forward mechanism. 
ii. Recoding: Recoding the data packets that are merely intended for it, therefore 
satisfying the basic confidentiality requirements and enabling the sink nodes to 
correctly decode data the packets and extract the information. Then the recoded 
packets should be forwarded correctly and validly.  
iii. State Dissemination: Participating in the timely dissemination of correct state 
information (applicable in the state-aware NC protocols) [11]. 
When a node violates one or more of these so called good behaviours rules, the NC 
system will be vulnerable to several attacks. There is a wide range of security threats and 
attacks in NC based systems. Furthermore, even in a network composed of benign nodes, 
lossy or erroneous channels may lead to corrupted codewords at the sink nodes.   
We shortly review general security threats that are vital to be managed by a NC 
system. Not addressing these threats may nullify the performance gain of coded networks 
or even worse they can completely disrupt the whole network operation. Security goals and 
requirements for an NC network are not limited to this short list and there are also other 
requirements, such as ordering, timestamp, location privacy, and self-organization [36, 
101, 102].   
4.2.1 Passive Threats and Attacks 
Passive threats and attacks do not disturb the normal operation of the network. 
Malicious nodes that perform a passive attack only snoop (or read) the exchanged 
information without modifying it. The detection of this type of attacks is difficult because 
it does not compromise the operation of the network. Passive attacks mainly violate 
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confidentiality or are used to reveal information on the network topology or capturing 
sensitive information such as passwords [103].  
Eavesdropping 
An eavesdropper attacker reads data traffic to obtain sensitive information (e.g., native 
data, secret keys, and location) about the other nodes. In NC stateless protocols, a 
malicious intermediate node can act as an eavesdropping attack if it has access to a 
sufficient number of linearly independent combinations of packets. In this case, the 
malicious node can easily decode the packets and can have access to all transmitted 
information. 
Figure 4.4 shows several possible scenarios for security attacks in a network coding 
system such as eavesdropping, selectively dropping, Byzantine modifying, and Pollution 
attacks (they will be discussed later in this section). Unlike figure 1.4, the time stamp of 
packets is disregarded in figure 4.4, for simplicity. Suppose that node E in figure 4.4.a only 
should send packet ⨁³, where ⨁ represents the bit by bit XOR of the two packets, and 
node E is not authorized to have access to the native packets  and ³. Here if node E, as an 
adversary internal eavesdropper, success to overhear at least one of two links AD1 and BD2, 
eventually it can decode XOR packets and obtain fully access to the both native packets  
and ³. Beside possible internal eavesdroppers, the network could be threatened by an 
external eavesdropper such as node F in figure 4.4.a; it tries to overhear AD1 and ED1 links 
to successfully decode the XOR packets and obtain unauthorized native packets  and ³.   
There are several solutions [104-116] for handling an Eavesdropping attack, as a main 
and the most important passive attack in the NC systems. A solution to the wiretap 
channels is  using homomorphic hash functions [117] in which all the intermediate nodes 
can verify the validity of the encoded packets on-the-fly prior to recoding them without 
knowing the content of native data packets. Also, random linear network coding has been 
shown to be a cipher, more specifically a Hill cipher, protecting the data if either (i) the 
attacker does not capture enough coded packets, even if the coding coefficients are sent 
unprotected, or (ii) if the sender encrypts only the coefficients [118]. 
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Traffic analysis and monitoring 
An attacker may monitor and analyse packet transmission in order to extract 
information about the source and the destination as well as the network topology. 
Generally, traffic analysis and monitoring threat is due to violating the privacy of nodes by 
an adversary node. Handling these threats could be more challenging because of 
intermediate nodes authorization for processing the packets in the NC systems. However, 
in the other hand, due to the nature of coded networks in using coded packets in 
intermediate nodes, NC has a potential to thwart these threats if a proper coding 
mechanism is applied. Both the state-aware and stateless NC protocols can be jeopardized 
by this threat. There are several works in the literature that have focused on traffic analysis 
threats and attacks [119-123].  
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Figure  4.4:  (a) node E bogus packets to carry out a pollution attack. Here also node E 
and F are internal and external eavesdropper respectively that try to overhear some 
unauthorized packets to obtain required information for decoding XOR messages. (b) 
Shows the Byzantine modifier node C that modifies received packets and performs invalid 
operation on them. Also the attacker node E selectively forwards some packets and drops 
the others. 
4.2.2 Active Threats and Attacks 
Active attacks, contrary to passive attacks, try to disrupt the normal network operation 
and may also alter, corrupt, or delete the data packets being exchanged in the network. 
Active attacks can be caused by an external (outside the network) or an internal (belonging 
to the network) attacker. As an example of an active attack in NC systems, a malicious 
node can store and pollute (corrupt) data packets by using malware processing functions 
and then forward (inject) the polluted packets into the network. This attack can extend 
(advance) rapidly, leading to a network full of polluted packets [103]. 
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Denial of Service (DoS) 
In NC based systems, when a victim node receives lots of  requests (such as packets 
processing and forwarding) from either reliable neighbors or adversary nodes, that may 
lead to lack of sufficient resources e.g., bandwidth, CPU power, memory, and battery level 
in the victim. A malicious node can easily perform a DoS attack by flooding its neighbors 
injecting lots of junction or corrupted block of coded packets. Therefore, due to the DoS 
attack, the victim nodes in NC systems should perform frequently the recoding, 
forwarding, and decoding functions on the corrupted or non-innovative packets: this leads 
to high traffic and rapid battery exhaustion in victims. 
 Also, DoS may have an unintentional origin when some particular nodes may become 
unfairly burdened to support many packets mixing, recoding, and forwarding functions due 
to their location in the topology of the network. This also can lead to more load these hot 
spots in terms of radio jamming and energy exhaustion. The DoS attacks can happen in 
different forms on several layers of the network protocol stack, like jamming and 
tampering at physical layer, collision, exhaustion and unbalanced loads at link layer, sleep 
deprivation, blackhole, routing table overflow at network layer, malicious flooding and de-
synchronization at transport layer, and finally failure in the remote services, e-banking, and 
web servers at the application layer [124]. Also, if attackers have enough resources like 
computing power and bandwidth they can perform a more severe distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attack. DoS can have a variety of origins and it affects different layers of 
network [36]. 
Due to the role of the intermediate nodes in packet mixing in distributed mechanism of 
NC systems, DoS is more challenging to handle. The mitigation techniques are statistical 
analysis of network traffic for detecting the suspicious nodes that send lots of packets, 
control messages, and requests to their neighbours, or applying an authentication and 
verification of traffic flows. Also packet leashes such as adding a field to the header of the 
packet in order to limit the maximum allowed hops for the packet can be another possible 
mitigation technique [125, 126].  
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Blackhole 
A blackhole attacker may exploit the routing protocols to advertise itself as a valid -
and usually the shortest- path to a destination [124]. This leads to place itself in the path of 
data packets toward that destination. Then, the attacker can intercept/eavesdrop the data 
traffic, or as a blackhole attack can simply deny the routing operations like packet 
forwarding. In more subtle forms of blackhole attack, called selective forwarding or 
dropping attack (e.g., node E in figure 4.4.b), the attacker selectively forwards some 
packets and drops the others. These type of misbehaviours can degrade the performance of 
the surveillance applications and also violate the privacy of legitimate nodes. Also, 
refusing to forward the packets and dropping them in the intermediate nodes may result in 
lack of sufficient coefficients for decoding in sink nodes and render the native packets non-
decodable in NC based surveillance applications.  
The source nodes in the NC aware systems may generate more coded packets to 
increase the chance of delivery. The state-aware routing protocol may also find several 
paths for each source-destination pairs to alleviate disruptive consequences of the selective 
forwarding and dropping attacks. However, all these mechanisms may lead to more 
overhead and thus degrade the throughput gain of the NC. Finding an efficient, scalable, 
and extremely lightweight solution for blackhole attack in the NC aware protocols is an 
ongoing research. 
Byzantine fabrication 
A Byzantine fabrication attacker generates messages containing false information. 
Specially, it can disrupt the routing operation of network in different ways including, but 
not limited to, forwarding data packets through non-optimal or even invalid routes, 
generating routing loops, modifying or altering packet headers, routing table overflow, 
route poisoning, and ACK pollution. Some of the most important Byzantine fabrication 
attacks include: 
i. Routing table overflow: Similar to the traditional MANET protocols, NC aware 
routings can apply proactive (table driven) and reactive (on-demand) routing 
approaches [6]. A malicious node, especially in a proactive approach, can advertise 
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lots of new routes to the nonexistent nodes in the networks to overflow other node’s 
routing tables.  
ii. Route poisoning: Malicious nodes can continuously flood fake or invalid control 
packets (such as routing requests, replies, errors, and hello packets) into the network 
to perform a routing table poisoning attack. Also, leading network layer misbehaviors 
like dropping routing control packets, creating routing loops, extending or shortening 
service routes, mis-reporting in packet reception, increasing end-to-end delay, and link 
quality falsification or modification, the attackers can decrease quality of services or 
worse yet they can lead to network partitioning and DoS attack through mixing all 
these behaviors [101].  
iii. ACK pollution: In an NC aware system, for each flow of data packets between a 
source-sink pair of nodes, the source node continuously flood the coded packets 
toward the sink node for the current generation of data packets until an 
acknowledgment (ACK) is received from the sink [127]. The attacker can deceive the 
source node by creating and injecting fake ACKs or modifying them and leading the 
source node to move onto the next generation. Therefore, the sink may not receive all 
the required coded packets in a generation for decoding the whole generation. This 
leads the source to keep sending coded packets from the current generation forever.   
 
General mitigation techniques can be the algebraic watchdog, packet authentication, 
and cryptography mechanisms [128]. 
Byzantine modification and pollution attack 
An adversary node may perform invalid coding operations on the transit packets and 
modify them incorrectly to perform a Byzantine modification attack. Many of the 
previously discussed attacks like wormhole, blackhole, selective forwarding and dropping 
attack, and routing attacks can be considered as a special type of Byzantine attacks.  
Figure 4.4.b shows a possible scenario for a Byzantine attacker in which the adversary 
node C, is supposed to perform valid XOR operation on the received packets, create 
correct packets like ⨁³, and eventually forward them toward downstream nodes. But it 
wrongly modifies the native packets, modifies the XOR packets, and instead of valid XOR 
operation, performs another invalid process on them. Figure 4.4.a shows a possible 
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scenario for packet corruption attack in which the adversary node E, receives some XOR 
packets like ⨁³ from upstream node C that should be forwarded toward sink nodes D1 
and D2, but it bogus corrupted packets like ¤ and forwards them toward sink nodes.  
Byzantine modification [104, 105, 126, 129-145] and pollution attacks [146-158] are 
the most important active attacks and probably, beside eavesdropping attacks, are three 
most studied security attacks in NC systems. Augmenting native data packets via 
additional or redundant information (e.g., parity checks) enables intermediate and 
destination nodes to check the validity of packets, drop the corrupted packets, and correct 
them when it is possible (error detecting and error correcting mechanisms). Monitoring 
neighbours via intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms are some mitigations 
techniques for handling these attacks. 
Entropy 
While eavesdropping or pollution attacks have received a great deal of consideration, 
there is another attack which has not been studied extensively enough: entropy attack. It 
happens when an adversary intermediate node generates valid but non-innovative packets 
that are trivial linear combinations of the stale packets, stored or overheard at an earlier 
time by the attacker. These valid but non-innovative packets decrease the decoding 
opportunities at sinks, waste network resources, and eventually degrade the overall 
throughput rate [159-161]. 
4.3 Current Security Mechanisms Taxonomy  
This section presents some mechanisms that can be used by NC to handle some 
security attacks that have been reviewed in the previous sections.   
4.3.1 Security via Network Codes 
In a system that errors occur frequently or there are several malicious nodes that inject 
a large number of polluted packets into the network, the capability of error correction in 
NC system can be degraded and overwhelmed [127]. Although NC mechanism for using 
intermediate nodes in packet coding may lead to several security issues; in the other hand, 
NC scheme itself has a security aware nature that can be useful for handling these attacks. 
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The inherent security mechanism provided by some NC schemes like RLNC can be easily 
combined (strengthened) with the application of other security techniques.  
For example, in RLNC, by applying a proper coding algorithm on the data packets, we 
can limit the capability of attackers to perform eavesdropping, since only the destination 
nodes who have access to sufficient decoding vectors can recover native packets [7, 98]. 
An adversary intermediate node can perform an eavesdropping attack on the transit packets 
for extracting some unauthorized information. The problem of eavesdropping attack can be 
modeled as follows [7, 162]: 
i. Suppose Alice is the source node and she wants to send the original coded packet x 
composed of N symbols to the sink node. 
ii. Bob is the sink node and he receives a coded data packet ¹ composed of N 
symbols. 
iii. Calvin, who is the malicious node, eavesdrops the coded packet º composed of R 
symbols.  
The coded packets », ¹, º can be represented as » = (oO ox … o"), ¹ = (¼O ¼x … ¼"), 
and º = (½O ½x … ½X). 
Several solutions [104-116] have been proposed to handle Eavesdropping attacks in 
NC systems especially in a wiretap channel [106, 110, 112-116]. NC, itself, due to using 
packet coding, is one of these solutions [114, 163-166]. 
Additionally, by using appropriate network codes, it is possible not only to detect 
corrupted packets, but also to correct them, mitigating a significant part of the most well-
known active attacks. However, error detection and error correction (erasure) mechanisms 
for NC systems, such as [98, 152, 167-173], may lead to some undesired problems. An 
error detection scheme creates monitoring overhead and error correction is possible only 
after occurring pollution attacks, which may bring about epidemic disruptive problems for 
an NC system. 
4.3.2 Security via Cooperative Mechanisms 
In information theoretic approaches [129, 130], intermediate nodes may simply insert 
some redundant decoding information into packets, recode packets, and forward them 
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toward sink nodes. Then, by means of this redundant information, the sink node, the only 
one being responsible to verify the received packets, can verify the received packets, detect 
corrupted packets, recover or correct them if possible, and drop the unrecoverable or 
uncorrectable packets [127]. Therefore, in information theoretic mechanisms, one 
corrupted packet epidemically may lead to several corrupted packets and can severely 
degrade the throughput of the network.  
Traditional watchdog [174] for MANETs [1] is based on a distributed monitoring, 
detecting, and isolating malicious nodes. All nodes in the network, by some mechanisms, 
like overhearing and acknowledgment control packets, are able to monitor their neighbours 
and detect malicious behaviors in them, like packet dropping, false routing information, 
and packet modification. After the monitoring and detection phase, nodes will inform each 
other about these malicious nodes and finally run an isolating phase.  
In an NC system, each intermediate node in a data flow, belonging to an arbitrary 
source-sink communication, may have a simple store-forward role, like nodes in 
traditional MANETs, in which the non-recoding intermediate node simply forwards it, 
without any packet processing. On the other hand, the intermediate node, depending on its 
position in the network topology or NC mechanism, can also be a recoding node that 
performs store-code-forward paradigm: it receives several packets from upstream nodes 
and, via different paths, mixes and recodes them into one packet, and forward it to 
downstream nodes.  
Like traditional MANET, an upstream node in an NC aware protocol can run 
Watchdog mechanism and overhear its non-recoding downstream neighbours. Hence, the 
upstream node is able to detect if the non-recoding downstream node is forwarding the 
exact packets properly or it is manipulating the packets and showing misbehaviours. 
However, traditional Watchdog fails in detecting misbehaviours of recoding malicious 
nodes. When benign upstream nodes forward packets toward a downstream attacker for 
more recoding operations, it can perform invalid recoding operations. In this scenario, the 
benign upstream nodes may have no chance to detect these misbehaviors via overhearing, 
due to the lack of sufficient information for decoding the downstream packets flooded by 
downstream attackers [127]. As a result, it paves the way for malicious node to creating a 
variety of misbehaviours. 
99 
 
In 2009, MinJi et. al [175] customized traditional Watchdog for MANETs and 
proposed the first version of Algebraic Watchdog  for NC networks. In Algebraic 
watchdog, nodes can verify their neighbours probabilistically and, by means of overheard 
messages, can police them locally [128, 142, 175, 176]. 
4.3.3 Cryptographic and Key Management Based Schemes 
The inherent security, provided by some NC protocols, like RLNC, can be easily 
combined (strengthen) with the application of other security techniques, such as the use of 
digital signatures, and symmetric or public key encryption. Cryptographic based schemes 
include a wide range of solutions for pollution attacks. A key management mechanism can 
be used to exchange shared keys with the sink nodes, which are used for the encryption of 
the coding coefficients [117, 133, 141, 146, 147, 156, 161, 177-186]. 
As mentioned before, NC systems are very vulnerable due to the coding role of 
intermediate nodes. Prolonging the verification process of the encoded packets to the 
extent that they reach the sink nodes can be potentially, the main reason for intensifying 
the disruptive epidemic damage of pollution attacks in the NC systems. This problem can 
be mitigated if intermediate nodes are able to verify polluted coded packets without 
knowing the native packets. Homomorphic Hash Functions (HFF) [117, 133, 156, 161, 
186] have this helpful property for NC systems. 
Any hash function like ℎ(. ) can map a normally large message like  into a typically 
small size output ℎ(). It is computationally very hard to reach  by having ℎ(), that 
means, finding ´ in a scene that ℎ() = ℎ(´) is very difficult. Beside these strong 
properties, Homomorphic Hash Functions have an additional property called 
homomorphism, in which hash of some native messages (like hash value of a linear 
combination of some messages in a RLNC system) is equal to combinations of the hashes 
of those messages [161].  
Therefore, because of the homomorphism property of these hash functions, all 
intermediate nodes in the pollution attack model, presented in the previous section, are able 
to verify the validity of encoded packets on-the-fly prior to mixing them algebraically 
[100]. Now that the intermediate nodes can collaborate in verifying the transit packets, 
polluted packets will be dropped very soon and malicious nodes can be detected and 
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isolated. Also, because of homomorphism property, the intermediate nodes can combine 
and encode the incoming hash packets and forward them without knowing the content of 
native packets or private key of the source node that prevents them from performing an 
eavesdropping attack. However, this solution has several drawbacks. It is computationally 
expensive and several works reported the poor performance of the scheme even by 
applying powerful CPUs [161, 187]. Also, the hash function parameters should be 
distributed among the network nodes before the communication and, in some 
implementation, a secure channel is needed for this purpose [188]. Figure 4.5 represents 
the security taxonomy in network coding systems.  
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Figure  4.5:  Security Taxonomy in Network Coding Systems 
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4.4 Analysis of RLNC 
4.4.1 Error Decoding Probability 
There are several cases in which the sink node in the scenario illustrated by figure 4.3 
and discussed in Section  4.1.2, may fail to fully recover the native packets even in a 
network composed of error-free channels and benign nodes. These cases lead to an 
increase in the decoding error probability. Some of these possible cases are: 
i. Insufficient receiving codewords: The sink node may not receive  codewords. In 
this case, the source nodes and the intermediate nodes (as a factory of codewords) 
may generate more codewords to be sure that the sink node finally receives sufficient 
innovative codewords. However, by using this mechanism, the redundancy of the 
code will be increased. 
 
ii. Insufficient rank: The sink node receives more than  codewords but the rank of the 
received codewords is not sufficient; it means that the receiving codewords are not 
innovative. This problem also can happen due to erroneous channels in the network. 
In a network with erasure channels and noisy links, the decoding error probability 
may severely increase. Beside generating more codewords in the source and 
intermediate nodes, this error can be decreased by using a large enough  for the 
finite filed size. However, large  will increase the complexity and the cost of 
encoding, recoding, and decoding operations. 
 
iii. Corrupted symbols: Even when sink node receives sufficient innovative codewords, 
it may fail to decode correctly due to receiving polluted codewords. These 
codewords have got polluted either by a malicious intermediate node (s) or by noisy 
links in the network. Several possible mitigation techniques have been proposed in 
the literature for handling the security attacks in a network coding based network. 
In our results in this section, where filed size is  = 2, the decoding error probability 
or failure probability of the decoding phase at the sink node is: 
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 = !<!¾!                     ( 4.10) 
where the source node floods totally ¿ data symbols into the network per generation 
however finally only ¿À of them are decoded successfully at the sink node (¿À ≤ ¿).  
4.4.2 Design Parameters 
As discussed in Section  4.1.2, there are several key features for an RLNC based 
system such as: 
i.  : Number of the native data packets in each generation (input native packets) 
ii.  : Size of each native data packet (number of the symbols) 
iii. l: Number of the output codewords per generation generated by the source node(s) 
iv. : Number of the output codewords per generation generated by the intermediate  
node(s) 
v. : Size of finite filed ¡ whose binary representation length  is  (where  = 2)  
These parameters can influence many properties of the constructed RLNC, including 
but not limited to: delay, code rate, code redundancy, coefficients overhead, decoding error 
probability, and security of the code. Also these parameters determine the complexity of 
encoding operation in source node(s), recoding operations in intermediate node(s), and 
decoding operations in sink node(s) as shown in Table  4.2 [189]. The number of symbols 
in data packet will be influenced by the field size. Also, the size of generated codewords in 
one second in the source node during the encoding phase could be considered as encoding 
throughput of an RLNC system (kB/s). The same concepts, i.e., recoding throughput and 
decoding throughput, could be considered for the recoding and decoding phase in the 
intermediate and sink node as well. All these throughput rates are influenced by both the 
field size and generation size. 
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 Encoding Recoding Decoding 
Complexity 7(l) 7() 7(x + ) 
Table  4.2: Complexity comparisons of three phases of RLNC in terms of per packet 
4.4.3 Simulation Analysis 
In this section, we present the simulation results related to the performance of the 
RLNC mechanism in two different scenarios. In all simulations, each packet size is 1024 
bits.  
i. First scenario: network composed of error-free channels and benign nodes 
The first scenario is an ideal network consisting of error-free channels and benign 
nodes. In this case, the results for the line network illustrated in figure 4.3, are categorized 
into two classes based on the number of intermediate nodes: i) there is no intermediate 
node (distinguished by the “SD” label in figures) and ii) there are five intermediate nodes 
(distinguished by “SI5D” label). We set the redundancy (i.e.,  = l .  as discussed in 
Section  4.1.2) to zero for first scenario. 
Results regarding encoding and decoding throughput: figure 4.6 shows the encoding 
and decoding throughput of the RLNC mechanism versus  where the finite filed ¡  size 
is given by  = 2. The generation size is 32 packets (i.e., each generation is 32Kb). 
Increasing  leads to a higher complexity for decoding phase; however, a small  can 
increase the decoding error probability and decrease the throughput of decoding. 
Therefore,  = 8 could be a trade-off for this case, as illustrated by figure 4.6. Also, the 
complexity of decoding is higher which leads to lower the throughput of decoding in 
comparison of encoding. Figure 4.7 shows the encoding and decoding throughput versus 
generation size where  = 8 and  = 16. The effect of increasing the generation size on 
the complexity of decoding phase is higher than the encoding phase as shown in Table  4.2. 
Therefore decoding throughput is lower than the encoding throughput as illustrated by 
figure 4.7. 
Results regarding decoding error probability: figure 4.8 shows the decoding error 
probability  versus . The lower   could be achieved by a larger filed size, as 
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illustrated by figure 4.8. However, a large filed leads to a higher complexity, delay, and 
memory consumption in the encoding, recoding, and decoding phase. Changing the 
generation size doesn’t affect the decoding error probability.  
 
Figure  4.6:  Throughput of encoding and decoding versus  (filed size  = 2) 
 
Figure  4.7:  Throughput of encoding and decoding versus generation size 
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Figure  4.8:  Error decoding probability () versus  
ii. Second scenario: corrupted symbols by erroneous channels or attackers 
In the second scenario, the erroneous channel or malicious intermediate node (as an 
attacker) may corrupt the transitive symbols (codewords) in several forms. Two of which, 
the most important ones, were investigated:  
i. Random corrupted symbols: several distributed random symbols inside each 
generation will become corrupted by the channel or attacker. 
ii.  Burst corrupted symbols: a burst of transitive symbols (i.e., several sequential 
symbols) inside each generation will become corrupted.  
The generation size is 32 packets and redundancy is zero for both cases.  Figure 4.9 
and figure 4.10 show  versus the percentage of symbols that randomly and sequentially 
(as a burst) will be corrupted by the attackers (or channels), respectively. As illustrated by 
figure 4.9 and figure 4.10,   grows very fastly in both mentioned cases.  
As the results show, the original mechanism of the RLNC is vulnerable against 
erroneous channels or intermediate attacker nodes. These type of channels and attackers 
corrupt the transitive symbols (codewords). To achieve a mitigation technique against 
packet corruption, in Section  4.5 and Section  4.6, we propose two novel mitigation 
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techniques for recovering native data packets in a network consisting of erroneous 
channels and attackers. 
 
Figure  4.9:   versus percentage of random erroneous symbols 
 
Figure  4.10:    versus percentage of burst erroneous symbols 
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4.5 Secure Network Coding for Eavesdropping 
As discussed in Section  4.3.1 ,linear combination of packets and protection of the 
coefficients from unauthorized access at intermediate nodes are useful for handling 
security attacks. Therefore one of the existing frameworks for handling security attacks in 
NC based systems is to modify the three phases of RLNC (i.e. encoding, recoding, and 
decoding) to achieve a network code that can provide a higher level of security, as 
illustrated by figure 4.5. In this context, we explored RLNC to handle eavesdropping 
attacks in NC based systems. 
In this section, we present serially concatenated network codes, constituted by the 
concatenation of LNC and RLNC.  The encoding phase of these codes is depicted in figure 
4.3. The proposed network coding based concatenated code (NCCC) mechanism, is a 
mitigation technique both against unauthorized accesses and against eavesdropping attacks 
due to malicious intermediate nodes.  
4.5.1 Three Phases of NCCC 
As illustrated by figure 4.11, NCCC mechanism has three phases: 
i. Encoding phase 
 The encoding phase has two steps: i) the source node (e.g., node S in figure 4.3) 
encodes the native data packets via LNC encoder; and ii) the source node encodes the 
output of LNC encoder via RLNC and floods the generated encoded packets into the 
network. These two steps both have two main features: 
i. Generation size (g): The number of packets that are linearly combined. The 
generation size of LNC (first step of encoding) and RLNC (second step of 
encoding) will be shown by O and x, respectively. 
ii. The number of bits per symbol (m) that are chosen from a finite filed ¡ by 
size  (where  = 2). This value for LNC and RLNC are O and x, 
respectively. 
The features of RLNC, i.e., (x , x), can be trivial for all intermediate nodes, but the 
features of LNC, i.e., (O , O) remains a secret between the source and the sink nodes and 
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need to be securely transmitted to the decoder(s). There are several possible solutions for 
transmitting (O , O). Some of them can be:  
i. The result of the hash function of the two values will be appended to the 
header of the first packet of each generation. 
ii. They can be transmitted via a secure channel. 
ii. Recoding phase 
An intermediate node (e.g., node I in figure 4.3) recodes the incoming encoded 
packets and forwards them toward the sink node (e.g., node D in figure 4.3). Note that the 
intermediate node(s) already knows x and x but it does not know O and O, which 
remain secret between the source and the sink. 
In a general scenario, (O , O) and (x , x) can be the same; however, we choose 
them differently as a security mechanism of NCCC. Therefore, a malicious unauthorized 
intermediate node that intends to make an eavesdropping attack, by decoding the incoming 
coded packets, should examine many possibilities to guess the correct (O , O) 
combination. The complexity of this operation is high and, consequently, prepares a level 
of security for the NCCC against eavesdropping attacks. Moreover, the intermediate nodes 
can still recode the incoming packets. Nevertheless, since they are unaware of (O , O), 
they cannot reach native data packets without paying a cost due to high computational 
complexity. 
 
Figure  4.11:  A scenario which illustrates the three phases of NCCC mechanism 
iii. Decoding phase 
 The sink node(s) should decode the incoming coded packets to extract the native 
information. Therefore, in NCCC based approach, sink node iteratively decodes the 
incoming generation, first with RLNC decoder and next with LNC decoder by having (x , x ) and (O , O), respectively. 
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4.5.2 Simulation Results 
In this section, we present the simulation results related to the performance of NCCC 
when the network is composed of error-free channels. As mentioned earlier, in NCCC 
mechanism, the first step of encoding phase via LNC uses m1 and the second step of 
encoding phase via RLNC uses m2 (filed size  = 2). We examined several (O,x) 
combinations which are summarized in Table  4.3. Other simulation features are the same 
as those in Section  4.4. 
case LNC: m1 RLNC: m2 
1 2 2 
2 2 4 
3 2 8 
4 2 16 
5 4 2 
6 4 4 
7 4 8 
8 4 16 
9 8 2 
10 8 4 
11 8 8 
12 16 2 
13 16 4 
Table  4.3: different samples of (O,x)  
Figure 4.12 and figure 4.13 show the decoding error probability and encoding and 
decoding throughput of NCCC mechanism versus (O, x), respectively.The simulation 
results for RLNC, presented in Section  4.4, proved that the minimum error decoding 
probability, i.e.,  ≈ 0, can be achieved for  ≥ 8. By applying NCCC mechanism, as 
illustrated by figure 4.13, the minimum error decoding probability, i.e.,  ≈ 0, can be 
achieved for NCCC by choosing (O = 2, x = 8).  Note that O = 2, which yields a 
very small filed size  = 2A= 4, for LNC has a very low complexity. Also, as illustrated 
by figure 4.12, using O = 2 for LNC encoder, as the first step of encoding phase of 
NCCC, does not decrease the decoding throughput.  
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Figure  4.12:  Throughput of encoding and decoding versus (O,x) 
 
Figure  4.13:  Error decoding probability () versus (O, x) 
4.6 Deploying Pre-coded Network Codes: LT and RLNC 
Let us consider an RLNC based line network, in which the source and destination 
communicate with each other via N intermediate nodes, as illustrated in figure 4.14. RLNC 
codewords have to pass through channels and relay terminals. However, as shown by the 
simulation results in Section  4.4, the erroneous channels or byzantine attackers that corrupt 
the transitive codewords can severely decrease the performance of RLNC.  
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Figure  4.14:  A RLNC based line network with N relays 
 
 
Figure  4.15:  BATS mechanism for recovering corrupted packets 
 
 
Figure  4.16:  The BATS code generate n encoded packets by having k native input 
packets: code rate 
A well-known approach for empowering RLNC based system to handle packet 
corruption is to use pre-coding techniques. Current network coding literature particularly 
focuses on Batched Sparse (BATS) code, a coding scheme that combines RLNC with Luby 
Transform (LT) codes [25] as a pre-coding scheme. LT codes are rateless error correcting 
code of the family of fountain codes, which can generate a variable quantity of encoded 
information according to the needs. Using an LT code as a pre-coding code for RLNC is 
theoretically described in literature such as [189, 190].  
An LT code is a code defined on bipartite graph. A bipartite graph can be algebraically 
represented by a binary matrix G. In particular, the rows and the columns of this matrix are 
respectively the nodes on the left and on the right of the graph, and each entry different 
from zero identify the presence of a connection between two nodes. In the special case of 
LT codes, the G matrix is randomly defined according to a robust Soliton distribution [25]. 
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However in this thesis, we explore LT as a pre-coding mechanism for RLNC encoder 
towards security applications specifically against byzantine attackers. Different phases of 
this technique of concatenating LT codes and RLNC are illustrated in figure 4.15. In this 
case, we adopt LT for pre-coding to provide a new security framework that proposes an 
additional degree of protection against third party attackers since malicious users will find 
it challenging to decode the LT packets since the decoding parameters will remain a secret 
between the source and sink nodes, whereas in previous applications the encoding 
parameter of LT approach were easily accessible. 
The features of BATS code, e.g., generation size and filed size of RLNC, can be trivial 
for all the intermediate nodes but G matrix of LT remains as secret information between 
source and sink nodes. Therefore, the intermediate nodes can still recode the incoming 
packets but they cannot reach to the native data packets. The source node(s) has several 
possible solutions for transmitting G matrix to sink node(s). Two of them are:  
i. The result of the hash function of G matrix will be appended to the header of the 
first packet of each generation. 
ii. They can be transmitted via a secure channel between source and sink nodes. 
The theoretical model that is presented in figure 4.15 has been implemented in 
MATLAB. The source is generating information composed by ¿ packets of the same size 
(1600 bits). Since the symbols are over a finite field of size  = 2Ä, each packet is 
constituted of 200 symbols. Next, the k packets are encoded into  packets and passed to 
RLNC encoder which generates l output encoded packets. In order to obtain reliable 
results, the simulations were performed with the iteration equal to 200.  
As we discussed in Section  4.1.2, the code rate shows the performance of the code. As 
figure 4.16 shows, the code rate of BATS is ­ = l/¿. By varying code rate, which 
determines the number of generated output encoding symbols by the source node, the 
probability of successful decoding will change. Therefore by considering different rates, 
i.e., ­ = 2,3,4, we calculate the error decoding probability   of  BATS codes.  
Assume the scenario network that is illustrated by figure 4.14 without any 
intermediate node. Figure 4.17 shows the error decoding probability of BATS codes versus 
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percentage of random corrupted symbols. The X axis shows the percentage of random 
corrupted symbols by either the channel or attacker nodes. By decreasing the code rate 
(i.e., by increasing code redundancy), we can decrease the error decoding probability. 
Also, we assume the scenario network, illustrated by figure 4.14, when there are five 
intermediate nodes in the network. Figure 4.18 shows the error decoding probability of 
BATS versus the percentage of random corrupted symbols.  
As the simulation results presented in Section  4.4.3 showed,  of RLNC, for the case 
where only less than 0.02 percent of transitive symbols became corrupted, is almost one. 
However, by using BATS coding scheme we can achieve a much lower .  
 
Figure  4.17:    versus percentage of random corrupted symbols: there is no 
intermediate node 
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Figure  4.18:   versus percentage of random corrupted symbols: there are five 
intermediate nodes 
4.7 Conclusion 
NC mechanism can reduce both the number of transmissions and the number of re-
transmissions, as well as increase the data transfer rate. These benefits directly translate to 
energy efficiency. In other hand, the paradigm of RLNC is highly well-matched with the 
dynamic trend of ad hoc network: any node can join to the network at a given time, start a 
communication by choosing the coefficients of linear combinations randomly over a finite 
field, and finally leave the network at any desired time. Also, due to the broadcast nature of 
the wireless channels in ad hoc networks, the store-code-forward mechanism of NC is very 
compatible with ad hoc network. However, due to the access of intermediate nodes to the 
transitive codewords, an attacker can make eavesdropping attacks as well as packet 
corruption.  
As a mitigation technique against eavesdropping attacks, we proposed Network 
Coding based Concatenated Code (NCCC) that uses Linear Network Coding (LNC) and 
Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC) in the encoding phase.  In NCCC, the 
intermediate nodes can recode like traditional RLNC. Our results show that although the 
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complexity of the proposed approach is close to RLNC, it is not computationally feasible 
for an intermediate attacker node to obtain the native packets. In fact, the required 
computation for an attacker is so costly in terms of energy consumption, that it will run out 
of power before completing the decoding process. Also, we applied Luby Transform (LT) 
code as a pre-coding mechanism for RLNC encoding phase in source node to achieve 
Batched Sparse (BATS) code. Our results show the high capability of BATS against packet 
corruption, as illustrated by figure 4.17 and figure 4.18. Original paradigm of RLNC, as 
simulation results presented in Section  4.4.3 showed, is very vulnerable against packet 
corruption and less than 0.02 percent of corrupted transitive symbols will lead to almost 
100% percent corruption (i.e., decoding error probability or  = 1) at the sink node. 
However, using the proposed technique, when symbol error rate is less than 0.02 percent,   is decreased to around 0.05. 
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5 Conclusion and Future Work 
In this chapter, we summarize the obtained results and provide some conclusive 
statements towards the key approaches investigated in this thesis, with some directions 
for future work. 
5.1 Conclusion 
The main conclusions of this thesis are summarized as follows: 
• Energy efficiency and load balancing are critical design requirement for ad hoc 
networking technology. Therefore, we proposed a new energy efficient and traffic 
balancing ad hoc routing protocol based on the well-known IETF AODVv2 protocol 
in Chapter  3. The new proposed routing protocol, E2AODVv2, achieves high 
performance with respect to energy consumption, balancing, scalability, network 
lifetime, and the percentage of failed nodes in comparison to well-known baseline 
protocols, as illustrated by figure 3.10-13. 
 
• We developed a new load balanced and energy efficient ad hoc routing protocol, 
called Load Balanced Dynamic Source Routing (LBDSR) in Section  3.2. Having 
modified the control packets, the routing tables, and the route selection procedure of 
DSR algorithm, LBDSR achieves higher energy efficiency and better load balancing. 
LBDSR can also be customized for either energy efficiency or load balancing, leading 
to a considerable improvement of up to 30% with respect to these metrics. This 
version is more lightweight and can be customized to be more energy efficient or 
delay aware.  
 
CHAPTER 5 
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• The approach for route selection that we developed for E2AODVv2 and LBDSR is 
technology agnostic. We take into account context parameters such as the energy of 
routes, length, and traffic to choose the best route. E2AODVv2 and LBDSR showed 
an improvement of up to 35% and 30% with respect to energy efficiency, respectively. 
The technology agnostic proposed approach can be applied to any legacy reactive 
routing protocols. Also it can be customized for energy efficiency or load balancing.  
 
• In wireless networks that take advantage of multi-hop communications, e.g., ad hoc 
networks, the store-code-forward approach of network coding can be an effective tool 
to improve energy efficiency. In these networks, network coding exploits the 
broadcast nature of the wireless channel to combine several input packets into several 
output packets to improve throughput and energy consumption. We proposed Network 
Coding based Concatenated Code (NCCC) that achieves tighter security against 
eavesdropping attack, unauthorized access, traffic analysis, and traffic monitoring by 
malicious intermediate nodes in NC systems. In this novel approach, the intermediate 
nodes, like traditional RLNC, are still able to recode the received codewords; 
however, the decoding features will remain a secret between the source and the sink 
nodes. Therefore, computationally, it is extremely hard for an intermediate node to 
obtain the native packets.  
 
• We analyzed Random Linear Network Coding (RLNC) and showed that NC is 
vulnerable to packet corruption due to erroneous channels or the security attacks. As 
simulation results (presented in Section  4.4.3) showed, even 0.02 percent of corrupted 
transitive symbols leads to almost 100% percent corruption at the sink node. 
Therefore, we proposed a mitigation technique for recovering the corrupted native 
packets by using BATS code. BATS, as an error correction code, uses Luby 
Transform (LT) codes [25] as a pre-coding technique for NC. However, we explored 
BATS code for security applications in NC based system. In the novel proposed 
paradigm, the decoding features of LT will remain a secret between the source and the 
sink nodes, and we can simultaneously recover the corrupted native packets to provide 
more reliable network codes. 
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5.2 Future works 
There are number of possibilities for future research. In the following, some research 
directions are mentioned: 
• One of the parameter for determining the quality of a link between two nodes is 
Signal-to-noise Ratio (SNR) which can determine the required amount of transmits 
energy per bit. The route priority functions for E2AODVv2 and LBDSR could be 
modified to take SNR of the links in a route as a metric that determines the priority of 
a route. 
 
• Until now, we have designed our routing protocols independently of the underlying 
wireless technology. However, the modulation and access scheme can create 
additional transmission delay reducing the performance of the overlay routing 
approaches. Therefore an interlayer collaboration (for example between Data and 
MAC) may empower the proposed protocols to provide more intelligent routing 
decisions. The lower layer can inform the upper layer about the quality of the link, 
thus customize its dynamic route priority function accordingly. 
 
• Wireless Sensor networks (WSNs) can also benefit from ad hoc networking and the 
proposed ad hoc routing protocols E2AODVv2 and LBDSR. WSN is a key enabling 
technology for next generation networks, having significant application in connecting 
a multitude of wireless tiny sensors or being able to operate in a more advanced mode 
by locally connecting different “things” of different capabilities, such as Personal 
Device Assistance (PDAs), Mobiles, laptops, and so on. WSNs technology has a 
profound effect on our everyday life due to its inherent features such as being 
ubiquitous in nature and offering an inexpensive alternative to traditional networks. 
However, nodes in WSNs are very limited in terms of battery power, CPU, and 
memory. Therefore, as a future work, E2AODVv2 and LBDSR can be customized to 
reflect the requirements of WSNs, as potential applications for NGNs.  
 
• Designing an efficient network code in the presence of all kind of adversaries and 
erroneous channels in the network still needs further studies. Mixing RLNC and other 
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error correcting codes is another green research field in the scope of network coding. 
We proposed two serially concatenated codes, i.e., i) LNC and RLNC and ii) LT and 
RLNC; however, other error correcting codes, such as Reed-Solomon code, can be 
also studied for empowering NC mechanism against security attacks and erroneous 
channels. 
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